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PROPERTY AND THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE 
Heather Hughes* 
ABSTRACT: 
The true-sale doctrine governs financial transactions involving hundreds of 
billions of dollars each year.  Yet this doctrine is confused, unsettled and 
subject to differing approaches from state to state: it lacks normative 
foundation and it lacks coherence.  The true-sale doctrine determines the fate 
of investors asserting ownership of securitized assets at the expense of 
unsecured creditors, such as employees.  It distinguishes assignments to 
secure loans (leaving assets potentially reachable by unsecured creditors), 
from outright sales (making assets the exclusive property of investors).  A 
rich literature addresses the efficiency of securitization. But scholars and 
policy-makers have failed to sufficiently relate positions on securitization’s 
efficiency to normative positions on the true-sale doctrine.  This Article maps 
arguments about securitization’s efficiency to formulations of the true-sale 
doctrine, to enable normative direction.  It then relates true-sale rules to 
property-law concepts as strategy for coherence.  The true-sale doctrine has 
not received scholarly attention in accord with its importance.  This Article, 
through mapping descriptions of securitization’s efficiency to formulations 
of true-sale rules, demonstrates why the doctrine matters.  Successful true-
sale rules must be grounded in a conception of property that can explain and 
justify investors’ rights of exclusion against a company’s unsecured 
creditors.  States’ property laws should confer rights of exclusion in 
securitized assets in a way that is (i) justified, given potential effects of 
exclusion on creditors in weak bargaining positions, and (ii) clear, given the 
costs of uncertainty in the legal foundations of market-dominant 
transactions.   
 
* Professor, American University, Washington College of Law. I am grateful for helpful 
comments and suggestions from Thomas Plank, David Snyder, Michael Carroll, Andy Pike, 
Ezra Rosser, Nancy Abramowitz, Ben Leff, Emma Coleman Jordan, Ken Anderson, and 
Steven Schwarcz; and to Shelley Han for research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The true-sale doctrine has been described as “the holy grail of the 
securitization market, a market in which hundreds of billions of dollars flow 
in transactions structured around constantly evolving ideas of what a true 
sale means.”
1
  This doctrine determines whether securitized assets constitute 
part of a company’s bankruptcy estate.  It distinguishes assignments to secure 
loans from true sales, after which assets are the property of a special purpose 
entity
2
 and belong exclusively to investors.  The true-sale doctrine is at the 
heart of receivables securitizations.
3
  Bankruptcy and, in some instances, 
accounting outcomes
4
 affecting employees, retirees and other creditors hinge 
 
 1.  Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial 
Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159, 161 (1996). 
 2.  This entity isolates assets from bankruptcy risk. See infra text accompanying notes 
19, 58. In some instances, the entity is also off-balance sheet. See also Thomas E. Plank, 
Securitization of Aberrant Contract Receivables, 89 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 171, 187 n. 56 
(2013). 
 3.  See infra Part I.A. for a definition and description of receivables securitization. 
 4.  See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. [hereinafter FASB], Accounting Standards 
Codification, Topic 860, Transfers and Servicing (2009) (replacing FASB, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards [hereinafter FAS] No. 166, which replaced FAS 140); 
Summary of Statement of No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial 
Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities – A Replacement of FASB Statement No. 125, FASB 
(Sept. 2000), http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum140.shtml [https://perma.cc/N896-ADWP] 
(last visited June 24, 2016). 
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on its correct administration.
5
  Yet this doctrine is confused, unsettled and 
subject to differing approaches from state to state.
6
 
The true-sale doctrine has not received scholarly attention in accord 
with its importance.  The doctrine can appear to be of little consequence: 
when a court interprets a deal that purports to sell assets to be instead a loan 
secured by the assets, the result is that the investors who claimed an 
ownership interest have instead a first-priority security interest.  The 
investors “win” anyway.  They just have to contend with bankruptcy 
procedures that impose costs on them.  This view underestimates the true-
sale doctrine.  First, recent literature has shown that whether parties make 
assets bankruptcy remote (by assigning them in a true sale) affects the 
efficiency of decisions about continuation and liquidation in bankruptcy.
7
  
Second, assets included in a bankruptcy estate, even if subject to a first-
priority security interest, may be reachable to secure continuation financing 
or to support operations of the debtor—such as wage and benefits obligations 
and payments to suppliers—for some period of time, so long as investors 
have adequate protection.
8
 
 
 5.  For discussion of the centrality of the true-sale concept to securitization, see infra 
text accompanying notes 53-57. 
 6.  See infra Part II. The laws governing secured transactions are highly uniform, thanks 
to Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9. UCC Article 9 governs receivables 
securitizations, in the sense that all conveyances of receivables must comply with UCC Article 
9 formalities to be enforceable. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1), (3) (stating that Article 9 applies to 
transactions, regardless of form, that create a security interest by contract, and also to sales of 
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes). But the question of 
whether a given receivables conveyance constitutes an assignment that secures an 
obligation—as opposed to an outright sale—is governed by the true-sale doctrine, apart from 
UCC Article 9. See U.C.C. §9-109 cmt. 4 (noting that “neither this Article nor the definition 
of ‘security interest’ . . . delineates how a particular transaction is to be classified,” and as 
such “[t]hat issue is left to the courts”). See generally U.C.C. § 9 (2010). The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) drafted and periodically 
revises the model UCC in conjunction with the American Law Institute (ALI). All U.S. 
jurisdictions have enacted UCC Article 9. Unless otherwise indicated, citations herein to the 
UCC are to the official text and comments of the ALI and NCCUSL. Note that some may 
question whether Article 9 governs receivables securitizations in which the transfer of 
receivables from the originator to the special purpose entity (SPE) takes the form of a capital 
contribution in exchange for equity in the SPE, as opposed to a sale for cash. See Kenneth C. 
Kettering, True Sale of Receivables: A Purposive Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 511, 
513 n.5 (2008). This Article does not engage this question of statutory construction, other than 
to note that UCC Article 9 does not limit “sales” to transactions in which parties exchange 
assets for cash.   
 7.  See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and Benefits 
of Bankruptcy Remoteness, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1299 (2011) (arguing that bankruptcy 
remoteness is valuable to ABS investors, based on findings that, after LTV Steel, Chapter 11-
eligible originators saw an increase in spreads that Chapter-11 ineligible originators did not). 
 8.  See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (adequate protection may be established with “an additional or 
replacement lien to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in 
HUGHES_FINAL_EIC ADJ_JUSTIFIED FOONOTE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2017  10:00 AM 
2017] PROPERTY AND THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE 873 
 
A rich literature addresses the efficiency and desirability of 
securitization, taking on the question of whether and when securitized assets 
should be bankruptcy-remote.
9
  Yet scholars and policy-makers have largely 
failed to relate positions on securitization’s efficiency to normative positions 
on the true-sale doctrine.
10
  This Article relates scholars’ arguments about 
the value of bankruptcy remoteness and the desirability of securitization to 
different formulations of true-sale rules. 
Many identify securitization as integral to the causes of the 2008 
financial crisis.
11
  Lawmakers have largely focused, since then, on federal 
regulation designed to: minimize moral hazard associated with off-balance 
sheet financing; require that originators and underwriters keep “skin in the 
game” when creating and marketing asset-backed securities; and ensure that 
consumers can make informed choices about financial products inspired by 
 
value of such entity’s interest in such property”); § 363(b)-(c) (allowing the bankruptcy trustee 
to use or assign property of the estate in certain circumstances); § 363(e) (providing that the 
court will prohibit or condition such use of property of the estate as is necessary to provide 
adequate protection to an entity that has an interest in property used or assigned); § 364(d)(1) 
(allowing the bankruptcy court to “authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt 
secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien only if (A) 
the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and (B) there is adequate protection of 
the interest of the holder of the lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or equal 
lien is proposed to be granted.”). See also Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing 
Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11 at 3, 11, 13-24 (challenging the 
contention that there is no need to consider unsecured creditors’ claims given the prevalence 
of under-secured “blanket liens”); Plank, supra note 2, at 177-78. 
 9.  See infra Part I.B. 
 10.  Scholars discuss the efficiency and desirability of securitization, and they discuss the 
true-sale doctrine and the fact that securitization’s efficiencies are a function of the legal 
isolation of securitized assets. But they do not analyze or make explicit the relationship 
between positions on securitization’s efficiency and formulations of true-sale rules, as this 
Article does. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1539, 1543-48, 1553-74 (2004); Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the 
Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1667-69, 1675 (2004). The most direct analysis 
of the relationship between true-sale rules and policy arguments about securitization is found 
in Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759 (2004). Janger 
focuses on the dangers and costs of statutory efforts to abolish the true-sale doctrine, pointing 
out that this doctrine prevents negative externalities such as excessive cost transfer to 
unsecured creditors, concealed liens, and balance sheet distortion. See id. at 1773. This Article 
departs from Janger’s in that it (i) more extensively maps arguments about the efficiency of 
securitization and bankruptcy remoteness to formulations of true-sale rules, (ii) focuses on the 
relevance of property-law concepts for developing more coherent and justifiable true-sale 
rules, and (iii) incorporates recent literature and developments. 
 11.  See, e.g., Lipson, infra note 50, at 1249 (noting that “even those who are not hostile 
to securitization would now seem to support this view” that “‘while there were multiple causes 
of the subprime boom and collapse, securitization itself was a significant cause of both,’” 
quoting Kurt Eggert). See also Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused 
the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1262 (2012). 
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and funded through capital markets.
12
  Meanwhile, the state-level, private-
law infrastructure of financial transactions, such as the true-sale doctrine, 
contains under-explored opportunities to improve market governance.
13
  
True-sale rules should be clarified and fortified to facilitate positive—and 
mitigate negative—externalities of securitization.
14
  This Article is a type of 
rule-of-law project.  Federal regulatory priorities will fluctuate.  States’ 
property laws should determine the bankruptcy-remoteness of securitized 
assets in a way that is (i) justified, given the effects of such determination on 
creditors in weak bargaining positions (such as employees); and (ii) clear, 
given the volatility that can follow from uncertainty surrounding the legal 
underpinnings of market-dominant transactions. 
As discussed below, recently, commentators have called for a 
“property-based” standard for identifying true sales of receivables.
15
 A true-
sale doctrine explicitly rooted in property law would be better than 
formulations currently in force in various jurisdictions.  But a successful 
approach to the true-sale doctrine must be grounded in a conception of 
property that can explain and justify investors’ rights of exclusion against a 
company’s unsecured creditors.
16
 
 
 12.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 
(2006 & Supp. 2011).  
 13.  See Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private 
Law, 20 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 179, 206, 220 (2015). Compare Ronald J. Mann, The Rise of 
State Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1805 (2004) (discussing who 
should decide, as between state commercial law and federal bankruptcy law, policy issues 
surrounding securitization), with Janger, supra note 10 (discussing the importance of the true-
sale doctrine, asserting that it “has a crucial regulatory component that enhances both financial 
transparency and helps maintain proper investment incentives”). 
 14.  Positive externalities of securitization are the efficiencies it can produce. See infra 
text accompanying note 66. Negative externalities of securitization include costs externalized 
to unsecured creditors in some contexts, raising both efficiency and fairness concerns. See 
infra text accompanying note 69. Different formulations of true-sale rules affect the extent to 
which legal isolation of securitized assets produces efficiencies, or conversely, aggravates 
negative externalities. See infra Part I.B. When securitization transactions involve an 
assignment that is a disguised security interest (not a true sale), negative externalities also 
include secret liens and accounting distortions. See Janger, supra note 10, at 1773. 
 15.  See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., When Is a Dog’s Tail Not a Leg?: 
A Property-Based Methodology for Distinguishing Sales of Receivables from Security 
Interests That Secure an Obligation, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1029 (2014). See infra Part II.C. 
Rather than consider factors such as recourse or price to classify a receivables conveyance, 
these scholars argue, we should ask only whether the originator retains an interest in the 
receivables that secures an obligation. Id. The term “originator” refers in this Article to a 
company generating and securitizing assets. See infra Part I.A for a description of receivables 
securitization and the various parties thereto. 
 16.  Such justification may be, for example, that the efficiencies securitization produces 
benefit investors and unsecured creditors alike; therefore, minimizing re-characterization risk 
with statutory true-sale safe harbors that exclude unsecured creditors from securitized assets 
is justified. By contrast, if securitization inefficiently extracts a subsidy from non-adjusting 
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In other words, the true-sale doctrine lacks clear connection to a policy 
justification (such as efficiency), and is inconsistent and sometimes 
incoherent.  This Article maps arguments about securitization’s efficiency 
and desirability to formulations of the true-sale doctrine to enable policy or 
values-driven understandings of the doctrine.
17
  It then situates true-sale rules 
vis-à-vis the property-law concepts of numerus clausus and rights of 
exclusion, as a strategy for both coherence and normative direction.
18
 
“Securitization” is a broad and diverse category of transactions.
19
  
Different types of securitization present different policy concerns.
20
  The 
relevance and consequences of the true-sale doctrine are greater in some 
securitization contexts than in others.
21
  This Article focuses on true sales of 
receivables
22
 for creation of asset-backed securities or “ABS.”  Whether a 
financial transaction is an outright sale of assets, rather than a security 
interest that secures an obligation (a “SISO”),
23
 has important consequences 
 
creditors in some contexts, then in order to justify exclusion of such creditors from securitized 
assets, true-sale rules could require fair-market-value pricing and terms for the assets. See text 
accompanying notes 99, 105.  
 17.  See infra Part I. 
 18.  See infra Part III. 
 19.  Securitization is the practice of selling assets to an SPE and then having the SPE 
issue securities backed by the assets. Securitization can reduce costs of capital for the seller; 
once the assets are transferred to the SPE they are isolated from other creditors of the seller. 
The SPE is set up to be bankruptcy remote from the seller. For more precise and thorough 
definitions and discussion, see infra Part I. 
 20.  For example, securitization of residential mortgages facilitates originate-to-
distribute lending practices that can aggravate moral hazard and create concerns for 
consumers entering into mortgage loans. Synthetic securitizations—re-securitizations or 
“ABS CDOs”—can be very complex and can create securities of specious value, undermining 
financial transparency and stability among the institutions that create and trade them. See infra 
text accompanying notes 22, 56. 
 21.  For example, in a remittance or future flow securitization the true-sale opinion serves 
a different purpose than it does in a receivables securitization—namely, to establish that under 
the laws of the originator’s jurisdiction the transfer of the first right to receive remittances 
accomplished a sale to a foreign purchaser. The goal is to minimize political risk, not to isolate 
the assets from those of the originator such that a U.S. court would find the assets to be 
unreachable by the originator’s creditors. See Heather Hughes, Securitization of Worker 
Remittances, in MOBILISING CAPITAL FOR EMERGING MARKETS: WHAT CAN STRUCTURED 
FINANCE CONTRIBUTE 101 (Doris Köhn ed., 2011). 
 22.  “Receivables” refers to all monetary obligations owed to a company by its debtors 
or customers. These can include invoices for sales of goods, credit card payments, loan 
obligations, contracts for services, or the like. This category typically does not include 
mortgage loans. Receivables securitizations, creating ABS, are similar, but distinct from 
securitization of real estate mortgages, creating mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”). See 
infra Part I.A. Further, ABS are typically collateralized by primary payment rights—a 
company’s actual receivables—rather than by synthetic or derivative rights, which typically 
back collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”). See infra text accompanying note 56. 
 23.  The Uniform Commercial Code definition of “security interest” includes interests 
that do not secure obligations, such as consignments and sales of certain financial assets 
HUGHES_FINAL_EIC ADJ_JUSTIFIED FOONOTE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2017  10:00 AM 
876 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19.4 
 
for creditors such as employees or retirees with interests in a company’s 
bankruptcy estate.  Assets assigned to secure a loan are part of the estate.  
Even though a secured investor may have a first priority claim, pending 
resolution of the proceedings the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession 
can (i) permit the company to draw on the assets to service wage and benefit 
obligations,
24
 (ii) offer adequate protection to investors, and (iii) assign 
interests in the assets to continuation financers.
25
  Assets sold, however, are 
no longer property of the company; the company no longer has any property 
interest in the assets to which a bankruptcy trustee’s lien could attach.
26
 
In most jurisdictions, the true-sale doctrine is governed by confusing 
and divergent case law.
27
  Some states override the doctrine with “Asset-
Backed Securities Facilitation Acts,” or “ABS statutes,” that deem all 
assignments of receivables for purposes of securitization to be sales, 
regardless of economic substance.
28
  These statutes confer “sale” status on 
transactions the economic substance of which would not otherwise warrant 
that status.
29
  In securitizations in which the originator is a bank subject to 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, FDIC rules, which contain safe-harbor 
provisions and reference accounting standards, may determine the status of 
securitized assets.
30
 
In an attempt to clarify and improve this area of law, Steven L. Harris 
and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., propose what they call “a property-based 
methodology” for distinguishing sales of receivables from SISOs.
31
  While 
 
included within the scope of Article 9, under § 9-109(a). As such, it is necessary to distinguish 
“security interests,” as defined by the code, from SISOs. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35). Some 
readers may assume that the term “security interest” implies an assignment that secures an 
obligation, but this is not the case in commercial law. 
 24.  Cf. Plank, infra note 132, at 630-31. 
 25.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(d)(1), 541. 
 26.  Note that a bankruptcy trustee may claim broad, equitable powers in initially finding 
“property interests” for purposes of attachment pending resolution of state-law questions 
about the status and scope of a debtor’s property interests. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) 
(stating that upon filing of a bankruptcy petition an estate is created that consists of “all legal 
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”), with 
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-06 (1983), and In re LTV Steel 
Company, Inc., 274 B.R. 278 (2001). 
 27.  See Harris & Mooney, infra note 31, at 1031. See also infra Part II. 
 28.  See ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-
2703A (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1109.75 (West 2016); N.C. GEN. STATE. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 54-1-10 (West 2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 9-109(e) (West 2015). 
 29.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 30.  See 12 CFR 360.6(b). See also infra text accompanying notes 214-219; comments 
from T. Plank (noting that FDIC rules govern only a minority of bank-sponsored 
securitizations). 
 31.  See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., When Is a Dog’s Tail Not a Leg?: 
A Property-Based Methodology for Distinguishing Sales of Receivables from Security 
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many consider the level of recourse between the seller and purchaser of 
receivables, and the adequacy of purchase price, to be central factors in 
determining whether a transaction is a sale or a loan,
32
 Harris and Mooney 
argue that these factors are not sufficient grounds for characterizing a deal.  
The only relevant questions, they assert, are whether the purported seller has 
retained an “economic interest” in the assets and whether the interest 
transferred to the purchaser secures an obligation.
33
  This standard is 
established in the true-lease context and should, they argue, apply to 
receivables transactions as well.
34
 
Harris and Mooney find a property interest wherever the purported 
seller retains an economic interest in receivables, and finds no property 
interest where the seller retains no economic interest.  But they fail to offer 
sufficient explication of, or justification for, such interest, or to adequately 
address important distinctions between equipment leasing and receivables 
securitization.
35
  This Article finds Harris and Mooney’s proposal to be 
promising but incomplete; they are correct to argue for an approach to true 
sales that is explicitly rooted in property law.
36
 
Part I defines “receivables securitization.”  It then presents literature on 
efficiency and bankruptcy remoteness, and on the relationship between 
accounting standards and legal rules.  It explains why the true-sale doctrine 
matters, the policy issues that it implicates, and the bankruptcy and 
accounting outcomes it affects.  An extensive body of literature discussing 
the efficiency of securitization reveals conflicting viewpoints.
37
  So far, 
scholars have not explicitly analyzed the relationship between arguments 
about the efficiency of securitization and normative positions on the true-
sale doctrine.  For example, one might think that if securitization is efficient, 
in a Kaldor-Hicks sense,
38
 then ABS statutes that eliminate re-
characterization risk would promote efficiency.  This view, however, fails to 
consider the (i) dynamic relationship between law and markets,
39
 and (ii) 
inefficiencies in bankruptcy that an over-broad ABS statute can aggravate, 
surrounding decisions about continuation versus liquidation and debtor-in-
possession financing.
40
  Part I presents this and other observations 
concerning the relationship between arguments about securitization and 
 
Interests That Secure and Obligation, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1029 (2014). 
 32.  See infra Part II.A. 
 33.  See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See infra text accompanying notes 232, 234-36. 
 36.  See infra Part III. 
 37.  See infra text accompanying notes 66-72. 
 38.  See infra text accompanying note 70. 
 39.  See infra text accompanying note 79. 
 40.  See infra text accompanying notes 87-92. 
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policy justifications for different forms of true-sale rules. 
Part II presents current approaches to the true-sale doctrine and explains 
why they are problematic.  It analyzes recourse and price as crucial factors 
in true-sale determinations, and discusses existing statutory approaches.  It 
then describes and critiques Harris and Mooney’s “property-based 
methodology” for making true-sale determinations, finding it to be an 
important, but incomplete, contribution. 
Part III discusses the value of establishing a method for making true-
sale determinations that is more overtly “property-based.”  Deal provisions 
that create recourse, express purchase price, or ensure that one or the other 
party receives surplus collections are enforceable as a matter of contract law.  
The true-sale doctrine is necessarily a matter of property law: it delineates 
the scope of interest that a transaction creates.  A more explicit, property-
based framing of true-sale rules would improve the doctrine’s coherence and 
normative grounding.
41
  Part III identifies two property-law concepts—
numerus clausus and rights of exclusion—that are integral to the true-sale 
doctrine, and describes their relevance in receivables conveyances.  
Understanding how these concepts apply in the receivables securitization 
context could lead to the development of better approaches to true-sale 
questions. 
Part IV identifies Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9 and 
bankruptcy law as potential sites for clarification of the true-sale doctrine.  
Two states already enact true-sale rules within UCC Article 9.
42
  To provide 
an alternative example, Part IV.A sketches possibilities for Article 9 
provisions that would codify the relevance of price in true-sale 
determinations.  This Article does not seek to establish that price should be 
determinative in true-sale analyses.  Rather, it relates positions on 
securitization’s efficiency and the value of bankruptcy remoteness to 
normative positions on true-sale rules.  For example, if lawmakers sought to 
assure a fair purchase price for securitized assets, because they believed that 
doing so would protect the interest of unsecured creditors, they could pursue 
this objective by revising UCC Article 9.  Part IV.A identifies sections of 
UCC Article 9 in which lawmakers could express such objectives.  Part IV.B 
then discusses the relationship between bankruptcy law and property law 
(including proposed section 912
43
 of the 2001 bankruptcy reform bill
44
).  
Federal bankruptcy law could be a viable site for clarification of true-sale 
 
 41.  See infra Part III.  
 42.  Texas and Louisiana enacted ABS statutes as non-uniform UCC Article 9 section 9-
109(e). 
 43.  This section was rescinded in 2002. See infra text accompanying note 281. 
 44.  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, H.R. 333, 107th Cong.; H.R. 333, 107th 
Cong. § 912(i) (2001). 
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rules, despite the general principle, in bankruptcy, of looking to state law for 
determination of property interests.
45
 
Ultimately, the true-sale doctrine is meant to align property rights and 
risk.  Characterizing a deal according to its economic substance prevents 
parties from engaging in regulatory arbitrage.  Transacting parties should not 
be able to avoid bankruptcy rules or UCC Article 9 rules for disposition of 
collateral by simply calling their transaction by the form that gives the 
investor the most advantageous legal position, despite the rights and 
obligations of the parties and impacts on any third parties affected by the 
deal. 
I.   WHY THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE MATTERS 
Some downplay the importance of the true-sale doctrine, pointing out 
that regardless of how true-sale disputes are resolved, investors prevail.  
They prevail either because they purchased assets in a true sale such that the 
assets are bankruptcy-remote, or because they purchased a security interest 
in the assets that entitles them to recovery, in bankruptcy, in advance of all 
other creditors.
46
  This part explains how this view underestimates the 
consequences of true-sale rules.  It relates true-sale rules to arguments about 
efficiency, securitization, and bankruptcy-remoteness—a task that legal 
scholars have largely neglected.
47
 
People use the term “securitization” to refer to deals involving many 
different types of assets,
48
 from tangible property, such as inventory, to rather 
abstract intangibles, such as remittance cash flows.
49
  This part defines 
“receivables securitization”—a concept that is more precise than the general 
(and sometimes loosely used) term “securitization.”
50
  It presents current 
 
 45.  See infra text accompanying note 266. 
 46.  See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 8 (presenting the concept of “equitable realization” 
to describe how Chapter 11 treats realization value in bankruptcy, finding that value created 
or preserved by Chapter 11 benefits all stakeholders).  
 47.  See Janger, supra note 10 (noting how, unlike other scholars, Janger analyzes the 
relationship between true-sale rules and the efficiency effects of securitization transactions). 
Again, to date, scholars focus on efficiency and fairness questions surrounding securitization, 
and they discuss the true-sale doctrine, but they leave largely to un-vetted implication the 
relationship between these rules and the efficiency effects that follow. For a summary of how 
this Article’s scope and analysis departs from Janger’s, see supra note 10. 
 48.  Jonathan Lipson succinctly states that the essential elements common to all 
securitization are three: “(1) inputs, (2) a particular structure, and (3) outputs.” Lipson, infra 
note 50, at 1239. 
 49.  For a description of remittance securitizations (i.e., securitization of “diversified 
payment rights,” or “future flow” transactions), as compared to more common receivables 
securitizations, see Hughes supra note 21. 
 50.  See Jonathan C. Lipson, (Re)Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1232-
HUGHES_FINAL_EIC ADJ_JUSTIFIED FOONOTE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2017  10:00 AM 
880 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19.4 
 
literature on the efficiency of securitization and the value of bankruptcy 
remoteness.
51
  Finally, it discusses the relationship between the law 
governing receivables securitizations and the accounting treatment of these 
deals.
52
 
A. Receivables securitization 
“Receivables” refers to all monetary obligations owed to a company by 
its debtors or customers.  These can include invoices for sales of goods, 
credit card payments, loan obligations, contracts for services, or the like.
53
  
Receivables appear on a company’s balance sheet; and they include all debts 
owed to the company, even if they are not currently due.  While “receivables” 
includes loans owed to a company, mortgage loans
54
 typically are not 
included in definitions of receivables.
55
  Mortgage loans are frequently 
pooled and securitized, creating “mortgage-backed securities” or “MBS.”  
“Asset-backed securities” or “ABS” refer to securities collateralized by 
receivables or other financial assets, other than mortgage loans.  In this 
Article, “receivables securitization” means a securitization of primary 
payment rights,
56
 derived from financial assets other than mortgages, to 
create ABS. 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, mortgage securitization 
received much attention, due to its relationship to the residential housing 
market.  Mortgage-backed securities have always been a significant part of 
 
33 (2012) (identifying a lack of definition for the term “securitization” in secondary sources 
and in laws governing securitization, and arguing for a coherent definition). Lipson finds 
“over two dozen regulatory and statutory definitions of the word ‘securitization’,” 
compounded by various definitions used by market actors and commentators. Id. at 1257. 
 51.  Kenneth Ayotte & Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and Benefits of 
Bankruptcy Remoteness, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1299 (2011) (arguing that bankruptcy remoteness 
is valuable to ABS investors, based on findings that, after LTV Steel, Chapter 11-eligible 
originators saw an increase in spreads that Chapter-11 ineligible originators did not). 
 52.  See infra text accompanying notes 122-50. 
 53.  See U.C.C. § 9-102(a) (defining of accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, etc.). 
 54.  These are loans secured by real property, governed by state mortgage law, as opposed 
to loans that are unsecured or that are secured by personal property, governed by UCC Article 
9. 
 55.  John Downes & Jordan Elliot Goodman, Receivables, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT TERMS (7th ed. 2006). 
 56.  Receivables are primary payments rights that back ABS, as opposed to synthetic or 
derivative rights that back collateralized debt obligations or CDOs. See Lipson supra note 11, 
at 1233-35, 1271-72 (defining true securitization as a transaction in which an SPE buys 
primary payment rights); Steven L. Schwarcz, Essay: Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons 
from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376-77 (2008) (describing 
distinctions among types of collateralized debt instruments by sketching the procedures in 
securitization and ABS CDO transactions).  
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the securitization market.  But by the early 2000s, receivables securitizations 
(involving various kinds of payment rights) had overtaken residential real 
property mortgages as a generator of new securitizations.
57
 
“Receivables securitization” refers to transactions in which a company 
(i) forms a legally distinct entity, called a “special purpose entity” or 
“SPE”
58
; (ii) conveys receivables to the SPE; and (iii) raises capital by having 
the SPE issue securities collateralized by the receivables to investors.  The 
company securitizing its receivables is called the “originator”—it is 
originating the assets conveyed to the SPE for purposes of securitization.  
The SPE is bankruptcy remote from the originator—it is a legally separate 
entity that meets standards for independence that assure it would not be 
consolidated with the originator in bankruptcy.  In order to be bankruptcy 
remote, the SPE must (among other things) have at least one independent 
director.  Investors may rely on “non-consolidation” legal opinion letters 
from counsel to the originator, in determining that an SPE is in fact 
bankruptcy remote from the originator parent company. 
In order for the receivables themselves to be bankruptcy remote, the 
originator must convey them to the SPE in a sale transaction (rather than a 
transaction that creates a SISO).  This is the aspect of receivables 
securitization that is governed by the true-sale doctrine and discussed 
throughout this Article. 
In order to raise capital, the SPE issues debt collateralized by the 
receivables it acquired from the originator, in the form of asset-backed 
securities.  Securitizations involve the issuance of shares, bonds, trust 
certificates, or other instruments, so long as they are recognizable to capital 
markets and have secondary market value.
59
  This Article uses the term 
“asset-backed securities” to refer to any of these.  The SPE acquires and 
holds a pool of receivables and then issues securities to investors.  Investors 
purchase the securities, giving the SPE cash that it passes through to the 
originator as the purchase price for the receivables. 
Receivables finance has long been a crucial source of capital for 
business.
60
  In recent decades, receivables securitization has become integral 
 
 57.  See Lipson, supra note 10, at 1248, citing Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,094, 
tbl. B (Apr. 29, 2011) (depicting “Securitization Market Share by Asset Class” between 2005-
2009, and noting that new securitizations had overtaken the RMBS market share). 
 58.  We might also refer to this entity as a special purpose vehicle or “SPV.” In some 
contexts, one might use terms such as “securitization trust,” or simply “issuer,” to refer to the 
special purpose entity in a securitization facility. 
 59.  See Lipson supra note 10, at 1240-41 (discussing how securitizations involve the 
issuance of bonds and shares, among other financial instruments, that are deemed to have a 
secondary market value). 
 60.  See White & Brunstad, infra note 156, at 158. 
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to capital markets.
61
  This development raises specific policy concerns.  
Originators that generate and securitize receivables can have many 
employees and retirees who are unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.  
Numerous commentators question the efficiency of receivables 
securitization, arguing that it permits originators and investors to extract a 
subsidy from, or artificially depress interest rates at the expense of, 
unsecured creditors.
62
  Others defend receivables securitization on efficiency 
terms.
63
  In addition, some maintain that it is unfair to permit originators and 
investors to externalize costs on to third parties, such as employees or tort 
claimants, who lack the capacity to alter their rate of return in response to 
the presence of investors with a superior claim to assets.
64
  Others disagree 
and do not find that securitization presents fairness concerns: these deals 
involve assignments of assets that exclude third parties just like any other 
property conveyance, such that there is no fairness concern specific to this 
deal type that justifies questioning its structure.
65
  Such policy concerns 
implicate the true-sale doctrine, as elaborated below. 
B. Bankruptcy remote finance: costs and benefits 
This section relates scholars’ arguments about the value of bankruptcy 
remoteness and the efficiency of securitization to the true-sale doctrine. 
 
 61.  See e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can 
Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 110 (2013) (discussing 
ABS and the regulatory reaction to the financial crisis: 
The Federal Reserve further undertook to support the consumer asset-backed 
securities (ABS) market through the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF). ABS are securities similar to MBS but collateralized by nonmortgage 
loans, such as automobile, credit card, and student loan receivables. The ABS 
markets historically have funded a substantial share of credit to consumers and 
businesses. Concerned that ‘continued disruption of [the ABS] markets could 
significantly limit the availability of credit to households and . . . businesses and 
thereby contribute to further weakening of U.S. economic activity,’ the Federal 
Reserve used TALF to provide nonrecourse funding to borrowers willing to issue 
new ABS. 
(quoting Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 25, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4YV6-HSUS] (citations omitted)). 
 62.  See infra text accompanying note 68. 
 63.  See infra text accompanying note 66. 
 64.  See infra text accompanying note 67. 
 65.  See infra text accompanying note 66. 
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1. Securitization and efficiency generally 
Securitization transactions produce efficiencies. They enable lower 
costs of capital, risk pooling, and liquidity for originators; they enable 
precise matching of risk profiles to risk preferences, diversification and risk 
spreading for investors.
66
  At the same time, securitization transactions can 
produce inefficiencies arising from the exclusion of originators’ non-
adjusting creditors
67
 from securitized assets.
68
  This Article does not seek to 
advance the debate over whether, and when, securitization is efficient. 
Rather, it seeks to align arguments about the efficiency of securitization with 
formulations of the true-sale doctrine in order to facilitate policy discussions 
about what true-sale rules should look like.  
In a nutshell, some commentators contend that securitization is 
inefficient because it permits originators and investors to extract a subsidy 
from the originators’ non-adjusting creditors, externalizing costs onto 
them.
69
  Others argue that because securitization lowers costs of capital, it is 
 
 66.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 
1541 (2004) (describing the benefits securitization can have for originators, such as lower-
cost financing, preferable risk allocation, and liquidity); Janger supra note 10, at 1770 
(arguing that securitization benefits investors and borrowers). 
 67.  Non-adjusting creditors are unsecured creditors who are not in a position to adjust 
their rate of return in response to changes in capital structure or financial condition of the 
debtor. Non-adjusting creditors include employees and many trade creditors. Tort claimants 
are non-adjusting creditors that are also non-consenting—that is, they do not consent to extend 
credit to the debtor in the first place. 
 68.  See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23–30 (1996) 
(describing how a company could divest itself of its assets through asset securitization but 
still use those assets during the course of its business); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable 
Logic of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55, 59–67 (1999) (analyzing Steven L. 
Schwarcz’s response to LoPucki’s The Death of Liability to refute the argument that the costs 
of judgement-proofing outweigh the benefits). But see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent 
Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing, through an economic 
analysis, that judgment-proofing techniques, such as LoPucki’s, may not be standard 
practice); James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki’s The 
Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998) (arguing that American businesses are making 
themselves increasingly judgment-proof). See also Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to 
Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 
1037 (2008) (finding that firms with high uninsured tort risk do not issue more secured debt 
than other firms, negating the redistribution theory of secured credit). Cf. Richard Squire, The 
Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 838-42 (2009) (stating that debtor 
opportunism in shifting costs to non-adjusting creditors is the most likely explanation for the 
persistence of asymmetrical asset partitioning). 
 69.  See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor’s 
Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1998) (identifying arguments against the efficiency of 
structured finance). This critique is rooted in “the puzzle of secured credit.”  The puzzle grew 
out of applications to secured lending of Franco Modigliani’s and Merton Miller’s theory that 
the value of a firm is not affected by its capital structure in a perfect market. See Franco 
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efficient in Kaldor-Hicks terms, and benefits originators, investors, and 
unsecured creditors as well.70  
Note that the arguments referenced here about efficiencies and 
inefficiencies of securitization pertain, to a large extent, to secured loans as 
well.
71
  Debates over the efficiency of UCC Article 9’s full-priority secured 
 
Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of 
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (arguing that, under certain assumptions, the value 
of the firm does not change based on whether it is financed by debt or equity). For a concise 
summary, see William W. Bratton, CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS 481–85 (5th 
ed. 2003) (summarizing the Modigliani-Miller thesis and assumptions by comparing it to the 
traditional approach in forming valuations and leverage). It may appear that secured credit 
lowers costs of capital by lowering interest rates available to debtors that issue collateral. 
However, in theory, altering the capital structure of a corporate entity should not change its 
value. Id. Investors adjust the interest rate charged for debt and the amount they will pay for 
an equity interest to reflect the riskiness of the investment. See Modigliani & Miller, supra 
note 69 (supporting the theory that debtors have no interest rate based reason to borrow on a 
secured basis if capital costs are the same). This raises the question: if an entity cannot change 
its average costs of capital by altering its capital structure, then why do debtors take on the 
transaction costs associated with issuing security for loans? See generally Alan Schwarz, The 
Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984) (analyzing academic 
arguments about justifications for security in an effort to find answers to the secured debt 
puzzle). Two general possibilities may explain this puzzle: (1) secured credit produces 
efficiencies (see Schwarcz, supra note 66); and (2) secured credit exports costs to third parties 
(see Bebchuck & Fried, infra note 71, at 864 (arguing that security interests under the full 
priority rule have distributional effects that create inefficiencies)). David Carlson has rejected 
the “puzzle of secured credit.” He contends that (1) Modigliani and Miller’s theorem itself is 
flawed because it disregards the effect of capital structure on debtor behavior, and (2) in the 
context of secured lending, the theorem’s application depends upon several irrational 
assumptions about secured loans. See David G. Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured 
Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179 (1994) (arguing that the most ordinary price theory shows that 
secured lending is rational). See also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
332–33 (1976) (using proofs to determine the optimal level of investment by firm managers, 
taking agency costs into consideration). Additionally, since the irrelevance theorem (like 
many economic theorems) assumes a perfect capital market, other real-world factors also 
affect the puzzle of secured credit.  For example, lenders do not decide what rates to charge 
given a debtor’s value in a vacuum.  Rather, interest rates are heavily determined by regulatory 
forces. Modigliani and Miller’s theorem has inspired extensive debate. The possibility that 
some debtors will use security interests to shift down-side risk to unsecured creditors persists, 
regardless of whether the prospect of exporting costs explains the prevalence of secured 
lending generally. 
      70.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 
1553-69 (2004) (arguing that securitization is efficient). Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy 
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 429 (1997) 
(discussing scholars who found that secured credit benefits the debtor but can increase the 
risk to non-adjusting creditors, who are not compensated for taking on this additional risk). 
 71.  See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of 
Secured Credit in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (analyzing full priority secured 
credit to show that costs of full priority can result in inefficient contracting between borrowers 
and lenders); Jacoby & Janger, supra note 8, at 48-52. 
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lending rules apply to, and are exaggerated by, securitization transactions.
72
  
Commercial law literature discusses extensively the critique that secured 
lending—and securitization—persist because they enable debtors to transfer 
costs to non-adjusting creditors. 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and ABS statutes.  If securitization is efficient 
because it lowers costs of capital and produces other efficiencies in capital 
markets, then the true-sale doctrine, it seems, facilitates efficiency to the 
extent that it solidifies the bankruptcy-remote status of assets.  This 
observation would appear to be the impetus behind the ABS statues and other 
legislative safe harbor provisions designed to create certainty and reduce or 
eliminate re-characterization risk.
73
 
But it is not necessarily true that if securitization is efficient and 
therefore desirable, then an ABS statute is the best approach to true-sale 
rules.  ABS statutes are over-broad and may undermine efficiency, even if 
we start from the premise that, in a Kaldor-Hicks sense, securitization 
generally is efficient.  This section sets aside the question of uncertainty of 
the current ABS statutes’ effects in bankruptcy (which is discussed below),
74
 
and focuses instead on two points.  First, the relationship between law and 
markets is dynamic.  The current legal landscape contemplates re-
characterization risk.
75
  Securitization may be efficient currently, but could 
become inefficient in a different legal landscape.  In the absence of re-
characterization risk, market actors may structure deals in ways that 
aggravate the possibility of negative externalities.
76
  Second, if an ABS 
statute is desirable, the formulation enacted in Texas,
77
 as non-uniform UCC 
section 9-109(e), is better than the broader formulation enacted in 
 
 72.  See Heather Hughes, Creditors’ Imagined Communities and the Unfettered 
Expansion of Secured Lending, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 425, 436-39 (2005) (describing how 
securitization amplifies scholars’ concerns about full-priority secured lending).  
 73.  See infra Part II.B. There is no extensive legislative history illuminating lawmakers’ 
objectives in enacting ABS statutes. However, some state laws may be instructive: Texas Bar 
commentary notes the need for certainty with respect to Texas usury law, and Delaware’s 
ABS statute facilitates accounting treatment as sales in transactions where lawyers cannot 
issue a true-sale opinion letter. See Plank, supra note 10, at 1733-34 (arguing that the statutes’ 
relevance extends beyond bankruptcy cases and may encourage courts to uphold sales in close 
cases). 
 74.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 75.  This is true even in jurisdictions that enact ABS statutes, given the possibilities of 
preemption or other, equitable qualifications of property interests in bankruptcy. See infra text 
accompanying notes 81-86. 
 76.  Janger has made this point as well. See Janger, supra note 10, at 1775 (arguing that, 
in the absence of substantive true-sale rules, parties may not be as concerned with how a judge 
may characterize the transaction after the fact, resulting in a greater number of inefficient 
transactions). 
 77.  Louisiana enacted a provision similar to the Texas statute. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
10:9-109(e) (West 2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 9-109(e) (West 2015). 
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Delaware,
78
 as the free-standing “Asset Backed Securities Facilitation Act,” 
because of implications for decision-making in bankruptcy.  These points are 
discussed in turn below. 
Markets are legally constructed in the sense that legally enforceable 
contractual obligations and property rights link market actors to one another 
and provide crucial infrastructure for market activity.  The law-finance 
dynamic is a complex subject.
79
  The relevance of this dynamic, here, is to 
observe that securitization—to the extent it is efficient—would not 
necessarily be more efficient if the law eliminated re-characterization risk in 
any and all transactions in which the parties call their conveyance a “sale,” 
regardless of economic substance.  It is an unanswered empirical question, 
and a shifting one over time, whether securitization is efficient despite costs 
to third parties, or whether it is inefficient because it externalizes costs.
80
  
Those who claim securitization is inefficient base their reasoning on the 
effects securitization can have on unsecured creditors.  Considering this, 
true-sale rules that eliminate re-characterization risk regardless of economic 
substance could aggravate the volume of instances in which securitization 
externalizes costs, such that in the aggregate securitization no longer creates 
wealth (through reduced costs of capital) in excess of such externalized costs. 
In distinguishing “legitimate securitization transactions from judgment 
proofing,”
81
 for example, Steven Schwarcz explains that in a securitization, 
originators receive value in exchange for assets securitized.  “[T]he goal of 
judgment proofing,” he states, “is to impose externalities on a firm’s 
creditors, preventing them from enforcing their claims against assets that 
otherwise should be available for payment.”
82
  Securitization is distinct from 
judgment proofing because the firm exchanges assets for cash, substituting 
 
 78.  Other states have enacted free-standing ABS statutes similar to the Delaware statute. 
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A 
(West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (West 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-1-10 
(West 2016); N.C. GEN. STATE. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (West 2015). 
 79.  Scholars such as Katharina Pistor, for example, assess the relationship between law 
and markets. See Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315 (2013) 
(stating a legal theory of finance (LTF) in which markets are legally constructed and occupy 
a hybrid public-private space). Law and finance may be in tension when enforcement of 
obligations threatens the financial system. Pistor describes a law-finance paradox in which 
markets are legally constructed, but legal elasticity at the apex of the financial-legal system 
demarcates power. Law tends to be binding at the periphery of the financial system and elastic 
at its apex. Id. The securitization market and the true-sale doctrine would provide an apt 
context in which to explore Pistor’s legal theory of finance. However, this Article does not 
undertake that analysis. 
 80.  Cf. White, supra note 68 (responding to LoPucki’s claim that corporations are using 
securitization to evade creditor liability). 
 81.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 83 n.94 (2013). 
 82.  Id. at 83. 
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one asset for another in a sale transaction rather than shifting assets off-
balance sheet to prevent recovery by unsecured creditors.
83
  “Securitization, 
much like a new-money loan, would not have a net adverse impact on non-
adjusting creditors of a company to the extent it entails the exchange of one 
type of asset (e.g., mortgage loans, automotive loans, or other financial 
assets) for another asset, cash.”
84
  Non-adjusting creditors are only harmed, 
he argues, to the extent the originator over-invests the cash or the risk of 
insolvency increases.
85
 
Schwarcz’s distinction between judgment proofing and legitimate 
securitization, however, assumes true-sale rules that require a fair exchange 
of assets for cash in receivables securitizations.  In a jurisdiction that enacts 
an ABS statute, or that does not rigorously analyze recourse and price 
provisions to establish that receivables assignments have the economic 
substance of sales, companies could securitize assets on terms that 
externalize costs onto non-adjusting creditors.
86
 
Again, this Article does not argue that securitization is efficient or 
inefficient.  It illuminates the relationship between positions on 
securitization’s efficiency and formulations of the true-sale doctrine. 
If one nonetheless takes the position that the benefits of lower costs of 
capital will always outweigh costs to third parties, then an ABS statute that 
eliminates re-characterization risk would seem desirable.  However, the form 
of ABS statute enacted in Delaware and other states raises a different set of 
efficiency questions concerning decisions about continuation versus 
liquidation in bankruptcy.
87
  Unlike in Delaware, the ABS statute in Texas is 
a non-uniform provision of UCC Article 9.
88
  Section 9-109(e), enacted in 
Texas, better facilitates efficiency than the Delaware statute, because its 
 
 83.  See Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 12-17 (explaining that an arm’s length transaction 
does not necessarily result in judgment proofing). But cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of 
Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1, 6 (1996) (finding that “currently effective judgment-proofing 
strategies are fully capable of defeating the liability system”). 
 84.  Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 66 BUS. L. 561, 584 (2011). 
 85.  Id. at 583. 
 86.  Similarly, in discussing the differences between securitization and covered bond 
transactions, Schwarcz assumes a substantive true-sale doctrine. Two crucial differences 
between covered bonds and securitizations are that (i) covered bonds have full recourse to the 
issuer, whereas securitization financing is non-recourse; and (ii) covered bonds involve a 
dynamic asset pool that remains on the issuer’s balance sheet, whereas securitization 
effectively fixes a segregated asset pool. See Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 
supra note 84, at 571, 586. These differences assume that the assignment of receivables and 
accompanying servicing arrangement for securitization do not contain provisions creating a 
level of recourse that is inconsistent with substantive segregation and sale treatment. An ABS 
statute enacts true-sale rules that would recognize a legal sale despite recourse level. An 
incoherent, poorly administered common-law approach could do so as well. 
 87.  See infra text accompanying notes 198-99. 
 88.  See infra note 197. 
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scope is limited to assets contemplated in UCC 9-109(a)(3)—receivables and 
the like.
89
  As such, Texas’s ABS statutory provisions eliminate re-
characterization risk
90
 only in securitizations of “replaceable” or “non-
essential” assets.
91
  As discussed below, Ayotte and Gaon find that 
bankruptcy remoteness of replaceable assets facilitates efficient disposition 
of assets in bankruptcy.  This is because the assets are not available for 
assignment in a debtor-in-possession financing, forcing financers to rely on 
the value of the firm’s projects; at the same time, the holders of replaceable, 
securitized assets do not have undue hold-out power over the firm, as they 
do in cases of securitization of essential assets.
92
 
Inefficiencies and the relevance of price.  Though many commentators 
argue that securitization is efficient, numerous others contest this position.  
Dissenters argue that securitization is inefficient because it involves 
extraction of a subsidy from unsecured creditors, artificially depressing 
interest rates by externalizing costs.
93
  Scholars expressed this position 
succinctly in a letter to Congress opposing proposed bankruptcy law section 
912, which would have functioned much like the state ABS statutes, 
eliminating re-characterization risk for ABS investors.  Their letter states: 
[Credit groups claim that] financing costs will be reduced [if 
lawmakers eliminate re-characterization risk] because of greater 
‘predictability.’ Unfortunately, it is not possible to lower total 
costs when total risks remain the same. Instead, §912 simply gives 
one group of lenders a much better position than all others, driving 
up the costs for all other parties. . . . Favored institutions may 
charge less to make loans if they know they will be given a 
substantial advantage over all the other creditors. Yet there is no 
reason that these securitized creditors should be given special 
preference over banks, bondholders, suppliers, tort victims, 
pension funds and employees who will be forced to bear the 
increased risks, whether they can afford it or not.
94
 
 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Again, this section forgoes discussion of uncertainty surrounding the effects of ABS 
statutes in bankruptcy. For such discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 204-12. 
 91.  See infra text accompanying notes 198-99. 
 92.  See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7 (finding that bankruptcy remoteness helps prevent 
inefficiencies when replaceable assets are securitized); infra text accompanying notes 235-
236 (noting that a “securitization” of essential assets would be a deal that is distinct in 
important ways from a securitization of receivables). This Article follows Ayotte and Gaon’s 
terminology for purposes of this part of the Article’s analysis. 
 93.  See supra note 69. 
 94.  Letter from Allan Axelrod, Professor Emeritus, Rutgers School of Law – Newark, 
et al., to Sen. Patrick Leahy and Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, AM. BANKR. INST. (Jan. 23, 
2002), http://www.abi.org/abi-journal/legislative-update-proposed-rules-amendments-
published-for-public-comment [https://perma.cc/KCH2-QAQ6]. 
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To the extent that securitization externalizes costs to other creditors, the 
true-sale doctrine can potentially aggravate—or mitigate—this effect.  Some 
critics contend that efficiency and fairness concerns surrounding 
securitization are inherent in the structure of these deals.  From this vantage 
point, the true sale doctrine may not significantly affect securitization’s 
consequences.  Others, however, point out that securitization may be 
problematic in some situations but not others—deal terms can make a 
securitization more or less efficient, or more or less fair. 
To the extent deal terms can affect the efficiency and fairness of a 
receivables securitization, purchase price, it would seem, is a deal term of 
significant consequence.  The true-sale doctrine could aggravate negative 
effects on third parties in contexts where it finds assets to be bankruptcy 
remote despite an inadequate purchase price.
95
  The doctrine could mitigate 
such effects, conversely, to the extent that it assures a fair and financially 
sound relationship between the value of the assets sold and the proceeds of 
the financing.
96
  For commentators who are concerned that securitization 
extracts a subsidy from non-adjusting creditors, fortifying a true-sale 
doctrine that assures adequate compensation to the originator could 
minimize this subsidy. 
Again, whether adequate purchase price (enforced with true-sale rules) 
would actually mitigate efficiency concerns depends on one’s opinion of 
securitization.  Some argue that the structure of securitization and first-
priority secured lending depend upon extraction of a subsidy from non-
adjusting creditors.
97
  From this perspective, securitization will artificially 
depress interest rates (externalizing costs), making it unfair to non-adjusting 
creditors, regardless of the adequacy of the purchase price an originator 
received for securitized assets.  (Also, even assignments that involve a fair 
purchase price for securitized assets exchange valuable assets for cash that 
the originator may then use in ways that do not add value to the firm or are 
disadvantageous to unsecured creditors.
98
)  Others, however, would consider 
whether assuring a fair price for assets securitized could enlist the true-sale 
doctrine in minimizing concerns about externalizing costs onto non-
adjusting creditors. 
For example, as noted above, Schwarcz’s distinction between judgment 
proofing and legitimate securitization turns on a fair exchange of assets for 
 
 95.  Note that technically, the purchase price should never be “inadequate,” because the 
seller both receives proceeds of the financing and holds the equity of the SPE. The adequacy 
of compensation question turns on valuation of the equity, not just the amount of the proceeds 
versus the valuation of the assigned assets.  
 96.  For discussion of the complexity of determining adequate price in this context, see 
infra text accompanying notes 183-87. 
 97.  See e.g., LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra note 68. 
 98.  See Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 583 (discussing harms of over-investment). 
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cash.
99
  Schwarcz, in discussing externalities of transactions, uses the term 
“responsibility failure” to describe a firm’s ability to externalize costs of 
taking an action.
100
  “Focusing on responsibility failure,” he writes, helps to 
“shift attention back to the fundamental cause of the externalities: in this 
case, the government’s failure to impose laws that limit the ability of firms 
to externalize those costs.”
101
  Following this line of thinking, we could 
conceive of true-sale rules that exclude non-adjusting creditors from assets 
despite inadequate purchase price as a responsibility failure on the state’s 
part. 
Scholars such as Robert D. Aicher and William J. Fellerhoff have 
argued that true-sale determinations should turn on whether the buyer has 
paid a fair market value for the package of rights and recourse received.
102
  
The main challenge to effectuating this approach lies in the complexity of 
determining an adequate price, given the number of factors that valuation of 
a receivables conveyance involves.  Such a conveyance may include various 
kinds of recourse provisions, servicing obligations, and complex 
discounting, as well as disparate information available to buyer and seller, 
disparate bargaining positions, and changing market trends
103
—all of which 
make it difficult for courts to determine the adequacy of a price.
104
 
The role of price in factors-based approaches to the true-sale doctrine is 
more thoroughly discussed in Part II.A.2.  The point, here, is to observe that 
to the extent commentators or policymakers believe that securitization is 
inefficient because it externalizes costs to non-adjusting creditors, true-sale 
rules that are designed to minimize such “subsidy” by promoting fair pricing 
could mitigate inefficiencies.
105
 
To date, literature on the efficiency of securitization exists largely apart 
from literature analyzing the true-sale doctrine.  Making explicit the 
implications of varying views on securitization’s efficiency for formulations 
of true-sale rules enables a more informed, policy-based approach to these 
rules. 
2. Ayotte and Gaon on the value of bankruptcy remoteness 
The consequences of re-characterization may seem minor, given that 
 
 99.  See supra text accompanying notes 66, 68-69. 
 100.  See Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, supra note 81, at 84, 93-94 (discussing the role 
externalities play in market failure). 
 101.  Id. at 93. 
 102.  See Aicher & Fellerhoff, infra note 168 (discussing ways to analyze securitizations 
and true sales in bankruptcy cases). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 105.  Part IV.A sketches a proposal for a partial codification of this approach. 
HUGHES_FINAL_EIC ADJ_JUSTIFIED FOONOTE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2017  10:00 AM 
2017] PROPERTY AND THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE 891 
 
investors in securitized assets still have a first-priority lien, pursuant to UCC 
Article 9.  But the difference between having investors that hold a first-
priority security interest in bankruptcy, versus an interest in assets that are 
bankruptcy remote, affects whether an originator can obtain new financing 
or must liquidate.  Ayotte and Gaon analyze the value of bankruptcy 
remoteness, given sources of possible inefficiency in bankruptcy rooted in 
decisions about continuation, versus liquidation, of the bankrupt firm.
106
 
Ayotte and Gaon find bankruptcy remoteness (of securitized assets) to 
be the feature that distinguishes ABS from secured debt.
107
  They then assert 
the value of bankruptcy remoteness in two ways.  First, they explain that 
because securitized assets are not part of an originator’s bankruptcy estate, 
they leave the originator with fewer assets that are assignable to raise debtor-
in-possession (DIP) financing, which “reduces the incentives of the DIP 
lender to provide new funds, which can mitigate the excess continuation 
problem inherent in the bankruptcy law.”
108
  Second, they compare ABS 
spreads over maturity-matched swap rates in the six-month period leading 
up to, and following, In re LTV Steel Company, Inc.
109
—a case in which a 
bankruptcy judge allowed an originator (LTV Steel) to use securitized assets 
as cash collateral during its Chapter 11 reorganization process.
110
  Their 
comparison finds that ABS spreads for Chapter 11-eligible originators 
increased significantly, as compared to spreads for originators that were not 
Chapter 11-eligible (and therefore subject to true-sale rules contained in 
FDIC regulation, rather than those applied in Chapter 11 proceedings, for 
which In re LTV Steel is relevant).
111
  To the extent that Ayotte and Gaon’s 
findings are accurate, they attest to the importance of legal true sales. 
Ayotte and Gaon discuss efficiencies surrounding continuation and 
liquidation in bankruptcies of Chapter-11 eligible securitizers.  They explain 
that the “key economic difference between ‘continuation’ and ‘liquidation’ 
is that the former (a) requires new financing, and (b) involves a delayed 
resolution, which may reduce the value of assets-in-place.  These conditions 
give rise to a conflict of interest between the manager/DIP lender coalition 
 
 106.  See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7 (concluding that bankruptcy remoteness is 
worthwhile to investors). 
 107.  Id. at 1300. Other commentators focus on benefits of pooling assets together and 
selling them to investors in tranches, or on securitization’s capacity to enable economizing on 
regulatory capital requirements. Id. 
 108.  Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1302. 
 109.  In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). See also infra text 
accompanying notes 159-64 (discussing LTV Steel Co.).  
 110.  See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1303 (discussing LTV Steel Co.)  
 111.  See id. (noting that “spreads on ABS issued by non-depository institutions increased 
by approximately 25 basis points more than the control group in the period following LTV.”) 
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and the initial investors in bankruptcy.”
112
  The capacity of the bankrupt 
entity to obtain continuation funding will be determined by the quality of its 
projects and its existing capital structure.  Managers, Ayotte and Gaon state, 
are biased towards continuation.
113
  This bias, along with the fact that existing 
claims are costly to renegotiate, leads to two possible sources of 
inefficiency.
114
 
First, a firm that has negative-value projects may continue inefficiently 
if it can obtain continuation financing.
115
  DIP financing is entirely senior to 
unsecured creditors, and can partially dilute interests of secured creditors—
a fact that several scholars have shown can lead to overinvestment and excess 
continuation.
116
  A firm’s capacity to obtain continuation financing depends 
on whether assets are included in the bankruptcy estate, and therefore 
available for assignment to a continuation lender (potentially diluting 
existing secured creditors).  Hence, to the extent that securitization involves 
a true sale of assets to a bankruptcy remote SPE, it lessens the capacity of 
the DIP to dilute pre-bankruptcy lenders, leaving continuation financers to 
look more fully at the value of the firm’s ongoing projects.
117
 
Second, a firm may liquidate inefficiently if it has positive-value 
projects but cannot obtain continuation financing.
118
  Whether securitization 
aggravates or mitigates inefficiency depends upon the type of assets 
securitized.  If the firm has securitized necessary assets, such as equipment, 
inventory, or intellectual property, then the hold-up power of ABS investors 
may impede efficient continuation financing. 
Ayotte and Gaon find that securitization is most valuable when the 
assets involved are replaceable assets, such as receivables.  “In such 
circumstances,” they state, “ABS provides maximal protection to creditors 
and subjects the bankrupt firm to a more stringent market test in order to 
receive new funds.”
119
  Secured debt, in contrast, can be preferable to ABS 
when the assets involved are necessary assets, because the investors have 
less hold-up power when they are secured creditors rather than ABS 
investors.
120
 
 
 112.  Id. at 1301 n.3. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1302 (citing G. G. Triantis, A Theory of the 
Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VANDERBILT L. REV. 901-34 (1993); R. 
Gertner & D. Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. 
OF FIN. 1189-222 (1991); M. J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. OF ECON. 
PERSP. 129-51 (1989)). 
 117.  Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1301-02. 
 118.  Id. at 1301. 
 119.  Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1302. 
 120.  Id. 
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Ayotte and Gaon measure the value of bankruptcy remoteness by 
comparing credit spreads in the ABS market before and after In re LTV Steel 
(and the increased risk of re-characterization that it presented).  They find 
that “increased risk of [re-characterization] results in lower overall efficiency 
and higher interest rates for ABS investors in equilibrium.”
121
  This Article 
does not vet Ayotte and Gaon’s empirical results.  Rather, their results are 
offered here as findings that—to the extent true—attest to the value of 
bankruptcy remoteness and therefore importance of the true-sale doctrine. 
For purposes of the true-sale doctrine, it is of utmost interest that Ayotte 
and Gaon find that bankruptcy remoteness has measurable value as 
compared to secured debt, when the assets securitized are receivables.  If 
bankruptcy remoteness in receivables securitization promotes efficient 
outcomes in bankruptcy, and re-characterization risk imposes costs, then a 
clear and well-administered true-sale doctrine would contribute to efficient 
outcomes.  Re-characterization risk can arise from either (i) substantive true-
sale rules that favor finding security interests when transactions are hybrid 
or complex, or (ii) uncertainty and lack of clarity surrounding the true-sale 
doctrine.  As such, the ABS statutes may, under Ayotte and Gaon’s model, 
facilitate efficient outcomes in bankruptcy to the extent they apply to 
securitizations of replaceable assets. 
C. Legal rules and accounting standards 
The accounting profession has a different orientation than the legal 
profession.  Accountants seek to have the books of a firm accurately reflect 
the firm’s practical economic position—not necessarily the firm’s legal 
position.
122
  Yet a firm’s practical economic position and its legal position 
are inter-related.  In the context of true sales of receivables, accounting 
standards consider legal isolation of assets. 
A true-sale legal opinion letter from counsel to an originator that is 
securitizing assets, in favor of investors, accompanies asset-backed 
securities.
123
  The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
124
 
 
 121.  Id. at 1303, 1322-26. 
 122.  See Aicher & Fellerhoff, infra note 168, at 204 (noting the distinct differences in 
accountants’ versus banking regulators’ practices). 
 123.  See infra text accompanying note 127.  
 124.  FASB operates under the Financial Accounting Foundation, a private, non-profit 
organization. Established in 1973, FASB replaced AICPA’s Accounting Principles Board as 
the official source of accounting standards for non-governmental entities. These standards are 
referred to as GAAP—generally accepted accounting principles; they are published in 
FASB’s “Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. xxx.” Since July 2009, FASB has 
issued Accounting Standards Codification (ASC), to make standards more accessible. The 
ASC, and Securities Exchange Commission guidance, represent the only authoritative sources 
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articulates—in FAS 140 and amendments—accounting rules for determining 
when securitized assets belong off of an originator’s balance sheet.
125
  The 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
126
 considers the 
true-sale legal opinion to be evidential in determining correct accounting 
treatment for a receivables financing.
127
 
 
of U.S. GAAP. About the FASB, FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUNDATION BD. (FASB), 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=FASB%2FPage%2FSectionPag
e&cid=1176154526495 [https://perma.cc/4CK5-96T2] (last visited June 18, 2016). See also, 
Policy Statement: Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector 
Standard Setter, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 25, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-
8221.htm [https://perma.cc/C5FD-7RYJ] (designating FASB’s financial accounting and 
reporting standards as “generally accepted”); Digital Timeline: 40 Years of FASB, FASB, 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/TimelinePage&cid=1175805309640 
[https://perma.cc/K3FD-AG3G] (lasted visited June 18, 2016) (“In 2002, FASB and AICPA 
agreed that AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee will no longer issue 
guidance that is considered authoritative US GAAP”).  
 125.  See FASB, Accounting Standards Codification, Topic 860, Transfers and Servicing 
(2009) (replacing FASB, Statement of FAS No. 166, which replaced FAS 140); Summary of 
Statement of No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities – A Replacement of FASB Statement No. 125, FASB (Sept. 
2000), http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum140.shtml [https://perma.cc/N896-ADWP] (last 
visited June 24, 2016); G. Wogan Bernard, Update on the Amendments to FAS 140 – 
Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets and Repurchase Financing Transactions (June 
2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/rpte_ereport/2009/june
/rp_g_wogan_bernard. authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7XY-Q293]; Project Update: 
Transfer of Financial Assets, FASB (June 22, 2009), http://www.fasb.org/project
/transfers_of_financial_assets.shtml#due_process [https://perma.cc/95FH-C9DG]; Revised 
Exposure Draft for Proposed Amended to FAS-140, FASB (No. 1610-100), 
http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_transfers_financial_assets_amend_st140.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6XNS-65YX]; General Summary of Comment Letters to the Proposed Amendments to FAS-
140, FASB, http://www.fasb.org/project/cl_summary_transfers_of_financial_assets.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BM44-FLN7] (last visited June 24, 2016). 
 126.  The AICPA is the largest U.S. professional organization of CPAs. It establishes the 
professional code of ethics for accountants. AICPA supports FASB’s standard-setting efforts 
with its publications: the Financial Reporting Executive Committee (FinREC) issues 
Comment Letters, which discuss financial reporting policies and AICPA’s positions on 
various proposals presented by FASB. About the AICPA, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. 
ACCOUNTS (AICPA), http://www.aicpa.org/About/Pages/About.aspx [https://perma. cc/RJ
6D-GJXU] (last visited June 22, 2016). Financial Reporting Advocacy, AICPA, https:// 
www.aicpa. org/Advocacy/FinancialReporting/Pages/FRAdvocacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/2
HV7-33JH] (last visited June 22, 2016). See also Accounting and Financial Reporting – 
Positions and Comment Letters, AICPA, https://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/FinancialReporti
ng/Pages/FinRECPositions.aspx [https://perma.cc/7WTP-366B] (last visited June 22, 2016). 
 127.  See Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants [hereinafter AICPA], AU-C §9620, 
Interpretation No.1: The Use of Legal Interpretations as Audit Evidence to Support 
Management’s Assertion That a Transfer of Financial Assets Has Met the Isolation Criterion 
in Paragraphs 7–14 of Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards 
Codification 860-10-40 (2015), https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/
DownloadableDocuments/AU-C-00620_9.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLE9-5EXU]; FAS 166
, §4(h) (June 2009) (suggesting a legal opinion letter of broader scope than before, covering 
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Accounting is central to financial reporting, and as such, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission affects accounting criteria for moving assets off-
balance sheet.  FAS 166 and 167 (amending FAS 140) seek to limit “sale” 
accounting treatment to instances in which the seller truly surrenders control 
of the assets.
128
  In any given receivables securitization, there may be a true 
sale for legal purposes, but not accounting purposes.
129
  In some instances, 
accounting treatment may be a motivation for securitization itself.
130
 
Legal isolation of securitized assets, for accounting purposes,
131
 is often 
established with true-sale opinion letters from attorneys—letters that are 
complicated by the convoluted nature of the true-sale doctrine and the 
uncertainties of bankruptcy.  In this sense, accounting practices are affected 
by the state of the true-sale doctrine.  True-sale opinion letters serve a variety 
of functions in the context of receivables securitization.  They are issued by 
counsel to the originator, for the benefit of investors, to assure investors that 
the assets backing the securities they purchase have been conveyed to the 
SPE in a true sale, such that they are not reachable by creditors of the 
originator in bankruptcy.
132
  Though these letters are issued to investors, 
 
all aspects of legal isolation instead of just the “true sale” component). The AICPA and the 
ABA Committee on Legal Opinions have collaborated in the process of delineating guidelines 
for reliance on legal opinions in connection with “legal isolation”; following the financial 
crisis the AICPA as revisited its requirements for legal opinions on true-sale treatment. See 
Steven O. Weise, AICPA Proposes Expansion of Form of True Sale Opinion, ABA BUS. LAW 
SEC., 12 IN OUR OPINION: THE NEWSLETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL OPINIONS, 13–17 
(2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law/newsletters/CL5
10000/full-issue-201212.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HQV-4BBG] (evaluating the 
form opinion proposed by the AICPA that would expand the scope of its standard true-sale 
opinion). 
 128.  Reza Dibadj, Four Key Elements to Successful Financial Regulatory Reform, 6 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 377, 381 n.17 (2010). 
 129.  See Schwarcz, What is Securitization? at 1286 n.18 (noting that a sale may transpire 
for accounting purposes but not for other purposes, such as bankruptcy). 
 130.  See Patricia M. Dechow, Linda A. Myers & Catherine Shakespeare, Fair Value 
Accounting and Gains from Asset Securitizations: A Convenient Earnings Management Tool 
with Compensation Side-Benefits, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 2 (2010). Accounting treatment may 
provide motivation to securitize assets, but current accounting rules are meant to discourage 
manipulation. See FAS 140, 166, 167, supra note 125; Lipson, supra note 50, at nn. 10, 130. 
 131.  Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
140, at 70-72, available at http://fasb.org/pdf/fas140.pdf [https://perma.cc/G455-HGDN]. 
 132.  See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1553, 1681-87 (2008) (discussing rating agencies’ role in the securitization market); Thomas 
E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A Prudent Legal Structure and a Fanciful 
Critique, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 632-40 (2008) (rebutting Kettering’s article by arguing 
that securitization as a financial product is not “too big to fail”); Steven L. Schwarcz, The 
Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2005) 
(remarking that true sale and nonconslidation opinions are issued by most major law firms) 
Tribar Opinion Comm., Special Report by the Tribar Opinion Committee: Opinions in the 
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rating agencies, and originators, the letters typically allow originators to 
provide copies to accountants to support an originator’s assertion that the 
transfer meets the legal isolation requirements for sale accounting 
treatment.
133
 
True-sale opinions are typically reasoned opinions.
134
  They include a 
host of exceptions, and an analysis of current law, based on which the issuing 
law firm opines that transferred assets would not be included in the assets of 
the originator (seller) if the originator becomes a debtor in bankruptcy or the 
FDIC appoints a receiver.
135
  Critics of rating agents’ practices in the wake 
of the financial crisis observe that rating agents (and other third parties 
relying on legal opinion letters) often focus simply on the opinion’s 
conclusion, without fully considering or understanding the substance and 
implications of the various qualifications the opinion contains.
136
 
The accounting profession and the legal profession have worked 
together to devise a form of true-sale opinion that can support the “legal 
isolation” requirement for accounting purposes.
137
  The AICPA proposed in 
 
Bankruptcy Context: Rating Agency, Structured Financing, and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 
BUS. LAW. 717 (1991) (discussing generally legal opinions concerning bankruptcy law issues 
offered in the context of financial and commercial transactions).   
 133.  Along with a true-sale legal opinion, investors typically require an enforceability 
opinion (attesting to the legal enforceability of the deal documents), and a non-consolidation 
opinion (attesting to the legal separateness of the SPE, as an entity, such that it would not be 
consolidated with the originator in bankruptcy). 
 134.  For a general discussion of opinions practice, and reasoned opinions, versus 
unqualified opinions, see DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER & FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL 
OPINIONS (2d ed. 2001 & Cum. Supp.); LEGAL OPINION LETTERS FORMBOOK (A. Sidney 
Holderness, Jr. & Brooke Wunnicke eds., 3d ed. 2010); Thomas L. Ambro & Arthur Norman 
Field, The Legal Opinion Risk Seminar Papers, 62 BUS. L. 397 (2007). 
 135.  See Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, The Proposed Bankruptcy Code Amendments 
and Securitizing Debtors and Their Creditors, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 321, 331 (2002) 
(discussing the difficulty of definitively concluding that a particular asset transfer is a true 
sale, and resulting unwillingness among law firms to issue unqualified legal opinions to that 
effect). See also Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The 
Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1684 (2008) (noting 
that opinion letters in securitization opinions can contain so many caveats that they are 
virtually ineffectual); Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User 
Fee Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1070 n.242, 1080 
(2009) (referring to transactional lawyers’ opinion letters as attorney work product loaded 
with ad nauseum caveats). Attorneys distinguish qualified opinions from “non-opinions”-
opinions that are so extensively qualified that they do not actually give the opinion they 
purport to render. ABA Guidelines advise against issuing “non-opinion” letters in favor of 
more explicitly expressing to the client and third party that the attorney cannot give the 
requested opinion. See, e.g., THOMAS L. AMBRO ET AL., CERTAIN GUIDELINES FOR THE 
NEGOTIATION AND PREPARATION OF THIRD-PARTY LEGAL OPINIONS II.C. (4) (1991) 
(accompanying the 1991 Third-Party Legal Opinion Report and Accord). 
 136.  See e.g., Kettering, supra note 135, at 1681-87. 
 137.  See Steven O. Weise, AICPA Proposes Expansion of Form of True Sale Opinion, in 
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2012 a suggested legal opinion letter that is much broader in scope than 
earlier forms, in that it covers all aspects of legal isolation (rather than just 
the “sale” question).
138
  The Business Law Section of the American Bar 
Association formed a group to address the AICPA’s proposal.
139
  The 2015 
adoption of the AU-C sec. 9620 appears to have ended discussion of broader 
opinion coverage.
140
  The AU-C sec. 9620 addresses an “auditor’s 
responsibilities relating to the work of an individual or organization 
possessing expertise in a field other than accounting or auditing when that 
work is used to assist the auditor in obtaining sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence.”
141
 
Accounting and legal standards for true sales are most explicitly 
intertwined in the context of the FDIC rules.
142
  These rules create a safe 
harbor from re-characterization risk for investors buying ABS from FDIC-
regulated issuers.
143
  They require that assignments of securitized assets meet 
accounting standards for sale treatment, other than the “legal isolation” 
element.
144
  The FDIC securitization rule was originally adopted in 2000, in 
reference to FAS 140.
145
  The rule both contemplated technical requirements 
of FAS 140, and assured investors that securitized assets would not be 
reclaimed by the FDIC in receivership or conservatorship of an FDIC-
regulated originator. 
The evolution of both FAS 140 and the FDIC rules after the 2008 
financial crisis, however, is complex.  In 2009, the FASB adopted FAS 166 
and FAS 167, amending FAS 140.
146
  These amendments substantially 
 
ABA BUS. LAW SEC., 12 IN OUR OPINION: THE NEWSLETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL 
OPINIONS, 13–17 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
business_law/newsletters/CL510000/full-issue-201212.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J3CR-42DW] (noting that the accountants may obtain support through a 
legal opinion for their proposition that an asset has been “legally isolated” from the 
transferor).  
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id.  
 140.  See comments from T. Plank. 
 141.  See “Using the Work of an Auditor’s Specialist: Auditing Interpretations of Section 
620,” available at 
https://www.aicpa.org/research/standards/auditattest/pages/clarifiedsas.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Q7JM-TQV4]. 
 142.  See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the FDIC rules surrounding the true-sale doctrine). 
 143.  See infra Part II.B.2 (detailing the safe harbors created by the FDIC rules); 12 CFR 
360.6. 
 144.  12 CFR 360.6(b); see infra text accompanying note 215. 
 145.  See Morrison & Foerster, “FDIC Issues Final Safe Harbor Rule,” News Bulletin, 
Oct. 5, 2010, available at https://media2.mofo.com/documents/101005-fdic-issues-final-safe-
harbor-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YKF-VCGZ] (discussing the history of the FASB 
securitization rule). 
 146.  Id. 
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narrow the instances in which an assignment of financial assets in a 
securitization transaction may be accounted for as a sale.
147
  After 2009, 
many deals that previously would have been accounting sales are treated as 
secured loans for accounting purposes.
148
  Lawmakers, then, revisited the 
FDIC securitization rule, taking the position that the safe harbor should apply 
differently depending on whether a transfer is a secured loan or a sale under 
the new accounting standards.
149
  The revised FDIC rules also require that 
securitizations meet other, reform-oriented qualitative standards.
150
 
II.   THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE: PROBLEMATIC, EXISTING 
APPROACHES 
This part describes existing approaches to the true-sale doctrine.  It 
discusses the limitations of these approaches, highlighting the importance of 
bringing a more thorough and theoretically grounded analysis to this area of 
law.  Sections A and B summarize common-law and statutory true-sale rules, 
respectively.  Section C presents and critiques an approach recently proposed 
by two prominent commercial law scholars.  Considering how much is at 
stake surrounding accurate administration of the true-sale doctrine, the 
confusion and lack of uniformity it entails are surprising (and disturbing). 
Before delving into descriptions of current approaches to true-sale rules, 
however, two points of context warrant mentioning: (i) the relationship 
between true-sale rules and UCC Article 9, and (ii) the case of In re LTV 
Steel Company, Inc. UCC Article 9 provides a uniform body of law 
governing receivables conveyances generally.  However, the Uniform 
Commercial Code does not contain provisions stating when an assignment 
of receivables constitutes a sale, rather than an interest securing an 
obligation.  The code leaves to case law or other statutes the question of how 
to characterize transactions.
151
 
UCC Article 9 states the steps that parties must take to create an 
enforceable receivables assignment, including that they follow Article 9’s 
notice requirements.
152
  A purchaser of receivables must perfect its interest 
pursuant to UCC Article 9, regardless of whether it is acquiring an ownership 
 
 147.  See Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 572; Sidley Austin LLP, FDIC Adopts Final 
Securitization Safe Harbor Rule, Oct. 4, 2010, available at 
http://www.sidley.com/news/structured_finance_and_securitization_100410 
[https://perma.cc/K77L-B74P]. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See infra text accompanying notes 213-18. 
 151.  See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 4 
 152.  U.C.C. § 9-203(b). This is the effect of U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3). 
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interest or a SISO.
153
  Article 9 governs conflicting claims to securitized 
receivables.
154
  In addition, it makes contractual restrictions on assignment 
ineffective to prevent enforceable assignments of receivables.
155
 
The intent of the parties, as established pursuant to laws apart from the 
UCC, determines the status of a transaction as a sale or loan.
156
  The difficulty 
comes in determining the parties’ intentions.  Generally speaking, the law 
infers intent from the economic substance of a transaction—not from the 
transaction’s form, meaning the language the parties use in describing their 
respective interests.
157
  Otherwise, parties could engage in regulatory 
arbitrage just by calling their transaction by the form that gives the investor 
the most advantageous legal position despite the rights and obligations of the 
parties, and any third parties affected by the deal. 
Given the complexity of receivables securitizations, it may be difficult 
to determine, before conducting a deal-specific analysis, whether a given 
transaction in fact involves a true sale.  UCC Article 9 contributes to opacity 
surrounding the legal nature of assignments of receivables to off-balance-
sheet entities for purposes of securitization, by making sales and SISOs 
indistinguishable in public records.
158
 
Judge Bodoh, in the (in)famous bankruptcy proceedings in In re LTV 
Steel Company, Inc.,
159
 stated that LTV Steel Company’s creditors retained 
a property interest in securitized assets pending determination of the true-
sale nature of LTV Steel Company’s assignment of assets to its off-balance-
sheet subsidiaries, LTV Steel Products and LTV Sales Finance.
160
  In the 
course of the bankruptcy proceedings, Judge Bodoh denied an emergency 
motion by investors to modify an interim order permitting the creditors of 
LTV Steel Company to draw on assets that had been assigned to LTV Sales 
Finance pending resolution of the case.  Judge Bodoh stated: “there seems to 
be an element of sophistry to suggest that [LTV] does not retain at least an 
equitable interest in the property that is subject to the interim order.”
161
  
Describing the basis for this property interest, he writes: “[t]o suggest that 
[LTV] lacks some ownership interest in products that it creates with its own 
 
 153.  U.C.C. § 9-203(b). This is the effect of U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3), including sales of 
receivables in the scope of Article 9.  
 154.  U.C.C. § 9-317(a), § 9-322(a). 
 155.  U.C.C. § 9-408. 
 156.  See JAMES J. WHITE AND G. ERIC BRUNSTAD, JR., SECURED TRANSACTIONS TEACHING 
MATERIALS, Fourth Edition (2013) at 365-70. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (extending the scope of Article 9 to sales of receivables) 
and § 9-505 (confirming that use of terminology designating parties as “seller” and “buyer” 
in a UCC-1 financing statement does not affect substantive transaction classification).  
 159.  274 B.R. 278 (2001). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 285. 
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labor, as well as the proceeds to be derived from that labor, is difficult to 
accept.”
162
  Judge Bodoh’s concern was for the approximately 17,000 
workers and 100,000 retirees that LTV Steel Company could potentially 
continue to support, at least through the bankruptcy proceedings, if it could 
access cash flows from receivables it assigned to LTV Sales Finance, 
generated by sales of inventory it assigned to LTV Steel Products. 
This concern from the bench sent shock waves through the 
securitization industry, causing market actors and lawmakers to fret over the 
legal underpinnings of securitization.
163
  LTV Steel Company withdrew its 
challenge and settled with the investor that claimed that LTV Steel Company 
retained no interest in the securitized assets to which a bankruptcy trustee’s 
lien could attach.
164
  The legislature in Ohio, where LTV was located, passed 
an ABS statute in order to try to override the true-sale doctrine and the 
complex questions that it presents.
165
  In addition, Congress contemplated a 
safe-harbor provision, proposed section 912 of the bankruptcy code,
166
 which 
failed surrounding concerns about securitization practices following the 
demise of Enron.
167
 
A. Factors-based approaches 
Case law addressing the true-sale doctrine is confusing, inconsistent, 
and sometimes incoherent.
168
  Courts refer to multiple factors in assessing 
 
 162.  Id.  
 163.  See White & Brunstad, supra note 156, at 372. Commentators disagree, however, on 
whether the shock waves and concerns about legal uncertainty were warranted. For example, 
Thomas Plank has observed that but for the unique structure of LTV’s inventory financing, 
its receivables financing would not have been questioned in court, and that the case does not 
threaten the legal foundations of securitization. See Plank, supra note 2, at 191-92. 
 164.  Note that this investor, Abbey National, funded LTV Steel Company’s operations 
with the securitization transaction at issue to rescue it from a prior bankruptcy. See In re LTV 
Steel Co., Inc., supra note 159, at 280-82. 
 165.  It is unclear whether the ABS statutes succeed in replacing the true-sale doctrine. 
Bankruptcy courts might refuse to recognize a form of interest that runs afoul of well-worn 
characterization doctrines establishing the scope of ownership of securitized assets. See infra 
text accompanying notes 204-12. 
 166.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 167.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); In re Enron 
Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 610 (S.D. Tex. 2002); 
Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or Dormant?, 
11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101(2002) (commenting on the significant problems with proposed 
section 912 especially as applied to Enron-type transactions); Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and 
the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1309, 1314-18 (2002) (describing concerns post-Enron, as well as risk of “overreaction” and 
“consequent over-regulation.”).  
 168.  Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1040. See also Robert D. Aicher & William J. 
Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer of Receivables as a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon 
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whether a given assignment of receivables is a true sale.
169
  These factors 
include: (i) recourse to the seller, (ii) seller retention of servicing and 
commingling of proceeds, (iii) failure to investigate the credit of account 
debtors, (iv) seller rights to excess collections, (v) seller repurchase options, 
(vi) rights to unilaterally adjust pricing terms, (vii) rights to unilaterally alter 
other terms of the transferred assets, and (viii) language of documents and 
conduct of parties.
170
  There is no standardized list of factors.  Commentators 
observe, however, that the two most important factors are price and recourse.  
This section discusses arguments for both price and recourse as bases for 
making true-sale determinations. 
1. Recourse 
True-sale analyses often focus on recourse—the extent to which the 
seller of receivables remains liable for the receivables’ performance.
171
  A 
high level of recourse, the logic goes, indicates that the purchaser did not 
acquire risk that is consistent with ownership.
172
  However, sales of many 
 
Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 186-98 (1991) (detailing the various 
factors courts use in examining sale and loan determinations for purposes of the true-sale 
doctrine). 
 169.  See In re Woodson Co., 813 F.2d 266, 272 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Simply calling 
transactions ‘sales’ does not make them so. Labels cannot change the true nature of the 
underlying transactions.”); In re Golden Plan of California, Inc., 829 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“Whether the parties intended outright sales or loans for security is determined from 
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transactions at issue.”); Major’s Furniture 
Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 544 (3d Cir. 1979) (“The question for the court 
then is whether the nature of the recourse, and the true nature of the transaction, are such that 
the legal rights and economic consequences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a 
financing transaction or to a sale.”); In re Commercial Loan Corp., 316 B.R. 690, 700 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting that courts do not rely on “any universally accepted set of factors” and 
instead “different courts consider different factors and give those factors different weight”).  
 170.  See Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 168, at 186-94. 
 171.  See, e.g., Peter V. Pantaleo, et al, Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of 
Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159 (1996) (discussing how a buyer retaining recourse 
complicates whether to view the transaction as a sale or a secured loan); Thomas E. Plank, 
The True Sale of Loans and the Roles of Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 287 (1991) 
(highlighting the uncertainty of true-sale determinations when an owner conveys loans with 
credit recourse). 
 172.  See generally, In re Qualia Clinical Serv., Inc., 441 B.R. 325, 329–32 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2011); Nickey Gregory Co. LLC v. AgriCap, LLC, 597 F.3d. 591, 599–603 (4th Cir. 
2010); In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc., 350 B.R. 465, 480–85 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006); In 
re Contractor’s Equipment Supply Co., 861 F.2d 241, 245  (9th Cir. 1988); In re Woodson 
Co., 813 F.2d 266, 270–72 (9th Cir. 1987); Major’s Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit 
Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 543–46 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Major Funding Corp., 82 B.R. 443, 447 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987); In re S.O.A.W. Enterprises, 32 B.R. 279, 281–83 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1983); In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc. 23 B.R. 659, 661–62 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); People 
v. Service Institute Inc., 421 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326–27 (Sup. Ct. 1979).  
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kinds of assets come with warranties of quality and other seller obligations 
to ensure that assets meet purchasers’ requirements.  The fact of recourse in 
most contexts, standing alone, does not indicate a SISO rather than a true 
sale.
173
 
Commentators and securitization industry participants draw 
distinctions among types of recourse—distinguishing credit recourse, from 
warranty recourse, from guaranties of market value or yield.
174
  Collectability 
recourse refers to provisions under which the seller guarantees assigned 
receivables or agrees to repurchase receivables if the account obligor 
defaults.  These kinds of provisions are analogous to warranties of quality, 
and therefore are consistent with true-sale characterization of the 
receivables’ assignment.  The buyer’s return is tied to performance of the 
assets, in accordance with their terms; collectability recourse provisions are 
like performance guarantees. 
In contrast, economic recourse refers to provisions that warrant a return 
to the buyer.  Economic recourse indicates that the assignment is a SISO and 
not a true sale.  Provisions providing economic recourse to the buyer concern 
more than just the quality of the assets; they warrant a return of the buyer’s 
purchase price, plus a yield, that is unrelated to the receivables’ payment 
terms.
175
 
2. Price 
Many consider price to be the most important factor to consider in 
making a true-sale determination.
176
  Price can be complex to assess in the 
receivables securitization context, which involves servicing arrangements, 
recourse, etc., creating challenges to administering price-based true-sale 
 
 173.  See, e.g., In re Commercial Loan Corp., 316 B.R. at 700–03 (noting that some courts 
might find the recourse aspect of a transaction significant, while others may not); Goldstein 
v. Madison Nat’l Bank, 89 B.R. 274, 276–79 (D.D.C. 1988) (determining that the existence 
of a recourse provision is not dispositive). 
 174.  See, e.g., Pantaleo, et al., supra note 1, at 162-63 (discussing two different types of 
recourse – recourse for collectability and economic recourse). Some courts distinguish 
between economic recourse and recourse for a breach of warranty, while other courts simply 
identify “recourse provisions” without further explanation. See also In re Doctors Hosp. of 
Hyde Park, Inc., 507 B.R. 558, 711-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013) (acknowledging that “recourse 
can take the form of a repurchase obligation or a guaranty of collectability by the seller, among 
other forms.”); In re Major Funding Corp., 82 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987). 
 175.  Pantaleo, et al., supra note 1, at 162-63. 
 176.  See, e.g., Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 168, at 206-10 (“If the effective price paid 
(accounting for all recourse, purchase price holdbacks, overcollateralization with a retained 
seller interest and similar devices) reasonably approximates what a willing buyer would pay 
a willing seller, the court should not decide that such recourse devices require characterization 
of the transaction as a loan.”). 
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analyses. 
If intent of the parties controls the characterization of a transaction, 
property law considers the relationship between the purchase price and the 
fair market value of the assets conveyed to illuminate the parties’ intent.  
Price, for example, is a factor in equitable mortgage doctrine.  If the price 
paid looks like a sale price—meaning, there is not a material disparity 
between the price and the value of the asset—then that seems like excellent 
evidence that the parties intend a sale.  The Restatement 3rd of Property 
observes: 
A substantial disparity between the value received by the grantor 
and the fair market value of the land at the time of the 
conveyance is strong evidence that security was intended. . . . 
Normally rational people, other than in gift transactions,
177
 do not 
transfer land without receiving a purchase price that 
approximates its fair market value.
178
 
Thomas Plank references equitable mortgage doctrine in his argument 
for the relevance of price in true-sale analyses.
179
  He directs courts to look 
to the parties’ characterization of the transaction, and assuming this threshold 
criterion is met, “[t]he first and most significant element of economic 
substance is the price paid for the loans.”
180
  Courts must assess the allocation 
of burdens and benefits of ownership, and analyze the value of the 
consideration for the transaction.  Plank presents a methodology in which 
courts would determine which party has the preponderance of burdens and 
benefits of ownership.
181
  The adequacy of the purchase price, then, relates 
to the allocation of burdens and benefits.
182
 
Similarly, Aicher and Fellerhoff argue that levels and type of recourse, 
per se, should not be determinative in true-sale cases.  The issue, rather, is 
whether recourse is reasonably priced into the transaction.  As they put it, 
the relevant question is: 
[W]hat would an informed and willing buyer pay a willing seller 
 
 177.  Property law recognizes transfers without any consideration at all—donative 
transfers or gifts. In these cases, price is irrelevant, of course, to intent to effectuate a 
conveyance. The type of property interest at issue here, though, is governed by UCC Article 
9, which requires, among other things, that value be given in order to create an enforceable 
security interest (whether SISO or sale). See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1) (requiring that value be 
given to create a security interest enforceable against the debtor). Security interests under 
UCC Article 9 cannot be donated or transferred as gifts; the codification of requirements for 
recognition of this type of property interest precludes the possibility. 
 178.  Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 3.2 (Am. Law Inst. 1997). 
 179.  Plank, supra note 171, at 334-35. 
 180.  Id. at 334. 
 181.  Id. at 337-39. 
 182.  Id. 
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for a transfer of the entire bundle of risks and benefits embodied 
in the cash flow represented by the receivables? If the ultimate 
price that the transferee pays, taking into account the presence of 
any direct and indirect recourse provisions, is notably less than this 
amount, a court should conclude that the transaction is a secured 
loan.
183
 
The difficulty that their approach—along with Plank’s—presents is the 
complexity of pricing a transfer involving complex valuations.  As Aicher 
and Fellerhoff acknowledge, the “ultimate price arrived at in a non-collusive, 
arms-length bargain is the result of many factors, such as information 
available to buyer and seller, diligence of seller in soliciting bids, relative 
bargaining strength, and prevailing economic conditions and trends.”
184
 
Buyers may demand discounts from the face value of receivables for 
the time value of money and the risk of non-collection.  This discount should 
reflect a return greater than existing rates available on investment of the 
purchase price in money market or other funds.  Even this discounting may 
be complex—the risk of non-collection, or default by account debtors, may 
not be easy to determine based on historical default rates.  These default rates 
may not be relevant in current or future market conditions. 
In addition to basic discounting for time value of money and predicted 
default rate, other discounts may be desirable.  There are efficiencies, for 
example, surrounding seller risk retention.  Sellers are in a better position 
than buyers to know and minimize risk of default by account debtors.  If the 
seller did not have economic incentive to minimize this default risk, the 
buyer would insist on a larger discount in the purchase price.
185
  By retaining 
risk, a seller gets a more favorable overall price than if the buyer assumed all 
risk.
186
 
In other words, recourse can produce efficiencies.  As such, recourse 
should not, standing alone, be a basis for re-characterizing a receivables 
conveyance.  The task is to determine whether the price a seller receives 
reflects a sale price, or is so heavily discounted and misaligned with risk 
retention, that the transaction should be treated as a loan. 
Despite the complexity of looking to price in true-sales determinations, 
price remains a prominent component among commentators and appears to 
be relevant to courts.
187
  If courts were to adopt Plank’s methodology, for 
example, over time a more coherent doctrine could emerge, grounded in 
holdings on what constitutes a preponderance of benefits or burdens of 
 
 183.  Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 168, at 207. 
 184.  Id. at 209. 
 185.  Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 168, at 209-10. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
HUGHES_FINAL_EIC ADJ_JUSTIFIED FOONOTE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2017  10:00 AM 
2017] PROPERTY AND THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE 905 
 
ownership, and what percentages of face value of receivables tend to 
correlate to such allocations of benefits and burdens.  Parties arguing for a 
characterization other than what these factors indicate, can then argue that 
their deal is distinct and bear the burden of explaining and justifying their 
specific allocation of risk and pricing.  Part IV.A below raises the possibility 
of codifying true-sale rules within UCC Article 9 that could facilitate this 
kind of doctrinal development.
188
 
An additional reason to consider price is fairness to unsecured creditors 
of the seller.  Commentators and lawmakers must consider when and why 
purchasers of receivables should enjoy rights of exclusion against seller’s 
creditors, especially non-adjusting creditors.  A true-sale doctrine that 
contemplates the value an originator receives in exchange for assets sold to 
an SPE better protects third-party concerns than one that recognizes the 
bankruptcy remoteness of assets that were assigned without a corresponding 
infusion of comparable value to the originator. 
B. Statutory approaches 
In some jurisdictions, state statutes override the common-law true-sale 
doctrine.
189
  With respect to originators that are banks subject to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act, FDIC rules that override the common-law true-sale 
doctrine may apply. 
1. ABS statutes 
In jurisdictions that enact an asset-backed securities facilitation act,
190
 
investors may enjoy rights of exclusion in receivables backing securities 
despite the fact that the transaction pursuant to which the issuer acquired the 
receivables would not be a true sale at common-law.  ABS statutes respond 
to concerns about the legal foundations of the multi-trillion dollar 
securitization industry, especially following In re LTV Steel Company, Inc.
191
  
Lawmakers worry that the securitization market could collapse if courts were 
to find that assets assigned to collateralize securities are not the property of 
the issuer, under the true-sale doctrine.
192
  ABS statutes attempt to override 
 
 188.  See infra text accompanying notes 254-62. 
 189.  See Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
633, 653-58 (2004). 
 190.  See ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A 
(West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (West 
2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-1-
10 (2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 9-109(e) (West 2015). 
 191.  See supra text accompanying notes 159-167. 
 192.  See Mann, supra note 13, at 1817 (relating the LTV Steel proceedings to a continuing 
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this possibility, by sanctioning an ownership interest in receivables despite 
the substantive scope of legal rights and obligations of the parties.
193
 
In Delaware, for example, the ABS statute provides that “any property, 
assets or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or in part, in . . . 
securitization transactions shall be deemed to no longer be the property, 
assets or rights of the transferor.”
194
  The statute does not define 
“securitization” and indicates that the term is to be construed broadly.  To 
the extent that—as Ayotte and Gaon assert—securitization of necessary 
assets can cause inefficient outcomes in bankruptcy, the Delaware ABS 
statute could compound that inefficiency by fortifying investors’ hold-up 
power vis-à-vis continuation funding for positive-value projects that require 
collateral.
195
  To the extent that—as many commentators assert—
securitization can create inefficiencies by permitting investors and 
originators to externalize costs into non-adjusting and non-consenting 
creditors, this ABS statute could compound such inefficiencies.  The statute 
sanctions the bankruptcy-remote status of assets even in context where levels 
of recourse and price indicate that the firm did not receive fair market value 
for the assignment (thus aggravating the subsidy-from-unsecured-creditors 
problem).
196
 
Taking a slightly different approach, Texas has enacted non-uniform 
UCC 9-109(e), which provides that: 
The application of this chapter to the sale of accounts, chattel 
paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes is not to re-
characterize that sale as a transaction to secure indebtedness but to 
protect purchasers of those assets by providing a notice filing 
system. For all purposes, in the absence of fraud or intentional 
misrepresentation, the parties’ characterization of a transaction as 
a sale of such assets shall be conclusive that the transaction is a 
sale and is not a secured transaction and that title, legal and 
equitable, has passed to the party characterized as the purchaser of 
those assets regardless of whether the secured party has any 
recourse against the debtor, whether the debtor is entitled to any 
surplus, or any other term of the parties’ agreement.
197
 
This form of ABS statute makes more sense than does Delaware’s free-
standing statute.  Texas’s UCC 9-109(e) ties ABS statute provisions to 
transactions governed by Article 9, under 9-109(a)(3).  In other words, this 
 
push for legislative action on true sales); Janger, supra note 10, at 1776 (noting that the clamor 
for ABS statutes became deafening after LTV). 
 193.  See Mann, supra note 13, at 1818 (observing the striking effects of the ABS statutes). 
 194.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A. 
 195.  See supra text accompanying notes 106-21. 
 196.  See supra text accompanying notes 66, 69, 71. 
 197.  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 9-109(e) (West 2015). 
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statute applies to sale of “accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or 
promissory notes”—receivables and other replaceable assets.  It does not 
apply to any and all securitizations.  Again, applying Ayotte and Gaon’s 
assertions, this approach to true-sale rules could promote efficient outcomes 
in bankruptcy.  The assets subject to the statute are replaceable (meaning that 
their bankruptcy-remote status does not create hold-up problems and forces 
continuation lenders to look to the value of projects, rather than the capacity 
to dilute existing lenders
198
), and the statute sets out to eliminate re-
characterization risk.  However, this section 9-109(e) sanctions the 
bankruptcy-remote status of assets in a way that could aggravate 
inefficiencies in the same way as other ABS statutes: by potentially 
aggravating the extent to which securitization enables extraction of a subsidy 
from non-adjusting creditors.
199
 
These ABS statutes are the equivalent of passing a law stating that all 
cars are blue for certain purposes.
200
  Not all cars are blue, but for legal 
purposes in a specific context, all cars are now blue as a matter of law.
201
  In 
fact, if we consider the ABS statutes in light of the property concept of 
numerus clausus,
202
 “we can view [them] as legislative recognition of a 
heretofore unknown form of property interest.”
203
 
Given the incongruity between the substance of the ABS statutes and 
doctrinal approaches to characterization of commercial transactions, the 
effectiveness of these statutes is uncertain.
204
  In bankruptcy court, an 
 
 198.  See supra text accompanying notes 117-20. 
 199.  See supra text accompanying notes 68, 69, 71. 
 200.  See Jeffrey M. Carbino & William H. Schorling, Delaware’s Asset-Backed 
Securities Facilitation Act: Will the Act Prevent the Recharacterization of a Sale of 
Receivables in a Seller’s Bankruptcy?, 6 DEL. L. REV. 367, 384-86 (2003) (noting explicitly 
in the Delaware ABS statute that “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to 
require any securitization transaction to be treated as a sale for federal or state tax purposes 
or to preclude the treatment of any securitization transaction as debt for federal or state tax 
purposes . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(b) (West 2003). 
 201.  See Reaves Brokerage Co. Inc. v. Sunbelt Fruit and Vegetable Co. Inc. (336 F.3d 
410, 417 (5th Cir. 2003) (exemplifying the fifth circuit’s decision not to apply UCC 9-109(e), 
and thus finding a loan transaction rather than a sale despite the parties’ express designation). 
The characterization at issue was not for purposes of securitization, but rather for purposes of 
the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act. 
 202.  See infra text accompanying notes 240-45. 
 203.  Hughes, supra note 13, at 220. 
 204.  A handful of cases cite to various ABS statutes, but none challenges the 
characterization of a transaction arguing that bankruptcy law, equity, or other property 
principles warrant a characterization that contravenes an ABS statute.  See Brothers. v. Saag, 
No. 4:13-CV-466-VEH, 2014 WL 7330869, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 2014) (rejecting the 
argument that after the securitization transaction the defendant had no authority to foreclose); 
In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc., 507 B.R. 558 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013); In re Argo Fin., 
Inc., 337 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2003); Tetra Applied Techs., Inc. v. H.O.E., Inc., 878 So. 2d 708 
(3d Cir. 2004); Express Working Capital, LLC v. Starving Students, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 660 
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originator (either as DIP or via its bankruptcy trustee) could assert that 
securitized assets were not conveyed to the SPE in a true sale, despite the 
applicability of an ABS statute.
205
  The bankruptcy court could, potentially, 
make a substantive determination on the true-sale status of the transaction,
206
 
rather than a determination based on application of an ABS statute.  As a 
practical matter, the impact that the ABS statutes have on securitization 
transactions depends upon the extent to which bankruptcy courts determine 
that the bankruptcy code or other federal law or policy does not preempt the 
ABS statutes. 
Bankruptcy courts generally look to state law to determine the scope of 
property interests held by the debtor.
207
  The basic rule is that state law 
governs, but a bankruptcy court could find a property interest in 
contravention of state law if it finds a countervailing federal interest
208
 as it 
“ascertain[s] and give[s] effect to congressional intent.”
209
  In addition to 
bankruptcy courts’ power to find a property interest in securitized assets 
despite applicability of an ABS statute, some commentators suggest that the 
plain language of Bankruptcy Code section 541
210
 expressly preempts state 
ABS statutes.
211
 
Others, however, contest this assertion, stating that while bankruptcy 
law permits adjustment of the state law rights of insolvent debtors and their 
creditors, bankruptcy law may not constitutionally impair the state law rights 
 
(N.D. Tex. 2014). 
 205.  See Mann, supra note 13, at 1806-07 (discussing federalism and the tension between 
state statutes, such as ABS statutes, and bankruptcy policy in the commercial finance context). 
 206.  See Plank supra note 189 (observing that bankruptcy courts differ from Article III 
courts with powers of equity, such that it is inaccurate to describe bankruptcy courts as 
exercising equitable powers when they modify creditors’ and debtors’ interests). 
 207.  See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 50 (1979) (using state law to resolve the 
question of “whether a security interest in property extends to rents and profits derived from 
the property”).  Cf. infra text accompanying notes 265-70. 
 208.  Id. at 55. See also In re Omegas Group, Inc. 16 F.3d 1443, 1450 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that “just because something is so under state law does not necessarily make it so 
under the Bankruptcy Code” as after state property law questions are determined, bankruptcy 
law dictates to what extent property is part of the estate). 
 209.  Matter of Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1374 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 210.  See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1). 
 211.  See supra Carbino & Schorling, note 200, at 384-85 (asserting that “an argument 
exists that the plain language of Bankruptcy Code section 541 expressly preempts the 
Securitization Act”). See also Edward M. Iacobucci and Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization 
and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 186 (2005) (stating that “[w]hile there 
is authority supporting the notion that federal bankruptcy proceedings should respect state law 
sales definitions that affect third parties . . . courts may conclude that federal bankruptcy law 
preempts these state law reforms”); Kenneth C. Kettering, True Sale of Receivables: A 
Purposive Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 511, 524-26 (2008) (arguing “there is a 
powerful argument that these state anti-[re-characterization] statutes would be preempted by 
the Bankruptcy Code in any adjudication of what constitutes property of the debtor’s estate.”). 
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of third parties.
212
  Whether this view precludes an express-preemption-based 
rejection of an ABS statute in bankruptcy, however, seems to turn on whether 
the conveyance at issue was a sale.  If the assignment of assets securitized 
was a sale, then investors are third parties, who invested in assets owned by 
an SPE.  If the assignment is not a sale, then they are construed as creditors.  
This question needs further illumination by lawmakers.  As of yet, the only 
conclusion we can draw is that the ABS statutes’ effects in bankruptcy are 
unsettled. 
2. FDIC rules 
When a securitization originator is a bank subject to FDIC regulations, 
those regulations may determine the scope of the bank’s bankruptcy estate.
213
  
These regulations state that the FDIC shall not re-characterize as property of 
the institution any financial assets transferred by an insured depository 
institution in connection with a securitization or participation, provided that 
such transfer meets all conditions for sale accounting treatment under 
generally accepted accounting principles, other than the “legal isolation” 
condition.
214
 
“Legal isolation” under the FDIC rules means “that transferred financial 
 
 212.  See Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 
487, 559-81 (1996) (discussing the limits of bankruptcy power); Plank supra note 189. 
 213.  See Julian B. McDonnell & James P. Nehf, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE 
UCC § 34.05 (2015) (stating that: 
The FDIC principally regulates securitizations originated by insured institutions 
through its Securitization Rule, which is stated at 12 CFR Section 360.6. Prior to 
the 2007–2008 financial crisis, this regulation provided that the FDIC would not 
use its authority as receiver or conservator under 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(e)(1) to 
disaffirm or repudiate securitizations provided they met the conditions for sale 
accounting treatment under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  
Before the meltdown of 2007–2008, the GAAP were found in FAS 140 issued by 
the Financial Accounting Standard Board.) 
 214.  This regulation states: 
[T]he FDIC as conservator or receiver shall not, in the exercise of its statutory 
authority to disaffirm or repudiate contracts, reclaim, recover, or recharacterize 
as property of the institution or the receivership any such transferred financial 
assets, provided that such transfer satisfies the conditions for sale accounting 
treatment under generally accepted accounting principles, except for the “legal 
isolation” condition that is addressed by this section. The foregoing paragraph 
shall apply to a last-in, first-out participation, provided that the transfer of a 
portion of the financial asset satisfies the conditions for sale accounting treatment 
under generally accepted accounting principles that would have applied to such 
portion if it had met the definition of a “participating interest,” except for the 
“legal isolation” condition that is addressed by this section. 
12 CFR § 360.6(d)(1). 
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assets have been put presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor, its 
creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, or a receiver, either by a single transaction 
or a series of transactions taken as a whole.”
215
 
Like the ABS statutes, the FDIC rules create a safe harbor for sale 
treatment.  They are more complex than those enacted in state ABS statutes, 
however, because the FDIC rules limit the scope of economic interest the 
safe harbor creates in reference to other, federal regulations concerning risk 
retention in securitization transactions.  Since their enactment in 2000, the 
FDIC rules have been revised twice.  They were revised in 2010 in response 
to 2009 revisions to accounting standards
216
 and the 2010 passage of The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
217
  The rules 
were revised again in 2015 in response to promulgation of new risk-retention 
regulations under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act.
218
 
Federal regulations regarding risk retention in securitization are 
designed, among other things, to mitigate moral hazard concerns associated 
with originate-to-distribute lending models.  These regulations that the FDIC 
true-sale rules coincide with are not designed to (and do not accomplish) 
improving the coherence of the true-sale doctrine.  As far as true-sale rules 
are concerned, the FDIC approach is problematic for the same reasons that 
the ABS statutes are: they create rights of exclusions in an originator’s assets 
without sufficient regard for why and when investors should have such 
rights, given efficiency or fairness considerations.
219
 
C. Harris and Mooney property-based approach 
Harris and Mooney state that price should not be relevant in a property-
based approach to characterizing true sales.
220
  They also eschew the 
relevance of recourse.
221
  This section presents their approach, finding that it 
lays a useful foundation for a more coherent doctrine, but ultimately is 
incomplete.  Their “property-based methodology” for true-sale 
determinations does not sufficiently substantiate the concept of “economic 
interest.”  Their analogy between the true-sale context and the true-lease 
context does not fully illuminate important differences between these two 
 
 215.  12 CFR § 709.10(a)(3). 
 216.  See FAS 166, 167, supra note 145-50. 
 217.  12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 218.  15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., added by Section 941(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 219.  See supra text accompanying notes 66-121, 237-49. 
 220.  See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1044-47, 1062, 1074-75. 
 221.  See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1042, 1072 (explaining that while a buyer’s 
reliance on recourse may prompt further analysis of a transaction, it should not carry any 
weight in the actual analysis itself). 
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deal types.  Harris and Mooney imply that classifying an approach as 
“property-based” is dispositive on the relevance of deal characterization to 
third parties.
222
  Yet much of property law concerns the question of when and 
why private law rules should recognize rights of exclusion.
223
 
Harris and Mooney argue that “a transaction should be re-characterized 
as a SISO if the interest transferred to the purported buyer is in fact not the 
functional and economic equivalent of ownership but rather the functional 
and economic equivalent of a security interest that secures an obligation.”
224
 
To determine whether the buyer has the functional and economic equivalent 
of ownership, they argue, the only relevant questions are whether the 
purported seller has retained a meaningful interest in the receivables, and 
whether the interest transferred to the purported buyer secures an 
obligation.
225
  They state that their approach is property-based:  it focuses 
solely on whether the seller retains an economic interest in the receivables 
that secures an obligation—not on factors such as recourse or price.
226
 
In order to determine if a seller retains an economic interest, they argue, 
we should look to established rules in the true-lease context.
227
  The law 
governing whether a lease of goods creates a true lease or a security interest 
is well-developed and mostly codified in UCC Article 1-203.
228
  Transactions 
that cannot be classified by application of UCC 1-203 alone, however, still 
require factors-based, case-by-case analysis.
229
  The key feature defining a 
true lease is that the lessor enjoys a meaningful residual interest; the asset 
has continuing economic life after the end of the lease term, giving value to 
the lessor’s residual interest.  If the transaction is structured in such a way 
that the lessor does not expect to recover the goods unless the lessee defaults 
on payments, then the lessee has the functional and economic equivalent of 
 
 222.  See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31; see also Steven L. Harris & Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices 
Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994). 
 223.  Enforcement of a property interest requires attention to the bases for rights of 
exclusion.  Numerous theories of property focus on rights of exclusion.  See Singer, supra 
note 12. Property theorists, though, are not unanimous on the centrality of exclusion. Cf. 
Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1853, 1854-60 (2012) 
(describing property in terms of mechanisms of internal governance and arguing that we can 
no longer regard the right to exclude as the single most important aspect of ownership). 
 224.  Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1050. 
 225.  Id. at 1032. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. at 1049-56. 
 228.  For a summary of true-lease doctrine, see JAMES J. WHITE & G. ERIC BRUNSTAD, JR., 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS TEACHING MATERIALS 117-21 (4th ed. 2013). 
 229.  See, e.g., Duke Energy Royal, LLC v. Pillowtex Corp., 349 F.3d 711, 719 (3d Cir. 
2003) (stating that where statutory factors are not met, courts will look to “the economic 
reality of the transaction in order to determine” whether the transaction is a true lease). 
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ownership (encumbered by the lessor’s security interest).
230
 
Harris and Mooney argue that true-lease laws provide the appropriate 
framework for undertaking true-sales analyses for securitized receivables.  
“The analysis of a purported true sale of receivables,” they state, “is the 
mirror image of the true lease analysis.”
231
  Their analysis proceeds, however, 
without sufficient discussion of the different purposes, contexts, and effects 
of equipment leases, as opposed to receivables securitizations.  Their 
objective is to identify economic interests in receivables (that secure 
obligations), based on an analogy to residual interests in leased equipment, 
without discussion of the different implications of these deal types. 
An “economic interest” in leased equipment, in Harris and Mooney’s 
analysis, is a residual interest—the value of the equipment at the end of the 
lease.  An “economic interest” in receivables, in their view, is any retained 
or re-acquired rights, of the seller, to collect on receivables.
232
  They do not 
explain or justify when and why “economic interests” are property interests.  
For example, lessees have an “economic interest”—a present possessory 
interest and use rights—in equipment that they have leased (in a true lease).  
We can describe originators as having an “economic interest” in securitized 
receivables, in the sense that they rely on proceeds of a securitization facility 
and retain equity of the SPE.  Originators may also have an “economic 
interest” in the sense that they may have exposure to risk through recourse 
provisions.  Harris and Mooney state conclusively that any economic interest 
associated with recourse provisions is not a property interest, just as a surety 
acquires no property interest in the obligation it guarantees absent 
assignment or subrogation.233 
The question for policy-makers is: what should the scope of property 
rights be, given the economic substance of a transaction?  The mere assertion 
that true-sale status should turn on whether a seller retains an “economic 
interest” in receivables is incomplete.  Policy-makers should undertake the 
task of elucidating what it means to have a property interest in receivables 
and when and why such an interest exists. Harris and Mooney approach this 
question as if it were a purely descriptive one, when, in actuality, property 
law is rich with differing concepts and theories on which lawmakers may 
draw in determining the proper scope of any given type of interest. The 
purpose here is to argue that true-sale rules should reflect normative 
commitments that are in accord with policy-makers’ views on the efficiency 
and desirability of securitization. If Harris and Mooney’s proposal is driven 
 
 230.  See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1051; White & Brunstad, supra note 228, at 
118. 
 231.  Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1052. 
 232.  See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1053. 
    233.   See Harris & Mooney, supra note 15, at 1072.  
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by a particular view of property, or by normative commitment to a policy on 
securitization, these aspects of their thinking are undisclosed. 
As discussed above, Ayotte and Gaon assess how the implications of 
bankruptcy remoteness differ, depending on whether the bankruptcy remote 
asset is replaceable or, conversely, necessary to the firm’s operations.
234
  
Receivables are a replaceable asset—their value functions like cash.  
Equipment, on the other hand, is a necessary asset.  Bankruptcy remoteness 
of replaceable assets promotes efficient commitments to re-organization, 
versus liquidation, in bankruptcy.
235
  Bankruptcy remoteness of necessary 
assets, on the other hand, can promote inefficient liquidations.
236
  From the 
vantage point of Ayotte and Gaon’s findings, the true-lease/true-sale analogy 
that Harris and Mooney support becomes more complex. 
Ayotte and Gaon are discussing the value of bankruptcy remoteness in 
the context of securitization of different types of assets, whereas Harris and 
Mooney are comparing securitization of receivables to a lease of equipment 
(in which the asset is bankruptcy remote in the sense that it is property of a 
lessor, not in the sense that it has been sold to an SPE).  The mechanism by 
which bankruptcy remoteness occurs in these two deal types, however, is not 
consequential for this analysis.  If efficiency in bankruptcy is an important 
policy consideration, then before we can conclude that the true-sale doctrine 
for receivables should track the true-lease doctrine, we should consider the 
objectives and implications of such an approach. 
In addition to the different implications of equipment leases, versus 
receivables securitizations, for continuation-versus-liquidation decisions, 
these deals have different implications for unsecured creditors.  A true-lease 
characterization of a deal in the context of a lessee bankruptcy entitles the 
lessor to continuing lease payments.  The lessee can continue to use and 
generate income with the leased equipment so long as it makes payments to 
the lessor.  In contrast, true-sale characterization of an assignment of 
receivables in the context of an originator bankruptcy means that only 
investors in asset-backed securities can reach the assets, depriving the 
bankruptcy estate of an important source of income. 
Harris and Mooney claim to espouse a “property-based methodology” 
for distinguishing sales of receivables from SISOs.
237
  What makes a 
methodology “property-based,” and why is that designation important?  
 
 234.  See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1312-16. 
 235.  See id. 
 236.  See id. 
 237.  Harris and Mooney also argue, in the debate over UCC Article 9, for a property-law 
framework as justification for full-priority secured lending. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 
15. Just as in the securitization context, the characterization of security interests as property 
conveyances does not warrant dismissal of policy concerns surrounding when and why 
property law bestows rights of exclusion. 
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They do not distinguish their “property-based” method from a “factors” 
method that considers distribution of surplus collections or seller retention 
of interests along with economic recourse provisions.  They do not 
sufficiently define or theorize the “economic interest” that, along with an 
obligation secured, should be grounds for SISO classification.  Nonetheless, 
Harris and Mooney are correct to argue for an approach to true sales that is 
explicitly rooted in property law. 
III.   PROPERTY AND RECEIVABLES CONVEYANCES: BETTER FRAMING 
FOR TRUE SALES 
Current approaches to the true-sale doctrine do not squarely address the 
scope of the property interest the doctrine determines.  Factors-based 
approaches suppress the centrality of property, focusing on the terms of deal 
documents as if the characterization question were a matter of contract 
interpretation of consequence only to the transacting parties.  Statutory safe 
harbors deem transactions to be legal sales based on contract terms, rather 
than on substantive assessment of the interest created. 
The true-sale doctrine implicates questions that are at the heart of 
property law—about exclusion, efficiency and information, governance, 
morality, etc.  Framing this doctrine in property terms can facilitate a more 
coherent approach to distinguishing ownership interests from SISOs.  So far, 
this Article has linked formulations of the true-sale doctrine to arguments 
about the efficiency and desirability of securitization, enabling lawmakers to 
make informed policy-based choices about the scope of property interest in 
receivables that constitutes an ownership interest conveyed in a sale.  This 
part identifies two property-law concepts—numerus clausus and rights of 
exclusion—that are integral to the true-sale doctrine.  It describes how these 
concepts apply in the receivables securitization context.  Drawing on these 
concepts could lead to clearer formulations of true-sale rules. 
In discussing the confused state of the common-law true-sale doctrine, 
Pantaleo, et al., state: 
Under contract law, parties generally are free to enter into and 
enforce any contract that is not illegal or against public policy; 
there is nothing about recourse, for example, that either is illegal 
or in violation of public policy. Common law favors the free 
transfer of rights to receive money where there are no significant 
externalities that have consequences to third parties. There is no 
legal or public policy which precludes a transfer from improving 
the value of an asset sold by adding its own guarantee.
238
 
 
 238.  Pantaleo, et al., supra note 1, at 159-60. 
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The provisions of a securitization transaction that create recourse or 
express purchase price or ensure that one or the other party receives surplus 
collections are all, as a matter of contract law, perfectly enforceable.  The 
question at issue in the true-sale doctrine is necessarily a property question: 
what scope of rights or interest does the transaction create?  Yet, much of the 
literature on true-sale rules declines to discuss this—perhaps because it is 
obvious, or perhaps because of the notion that there is no viable or 
consequential distinction to be made between contract law and property 
law.
239
 
Numerus clausus.  We can understand the true-sale doctrine as an 
example of the concept of numerus clausus.  Conceptually, we refer to 
“numerus clausus” to express the notion that property law permits only 
legally recognizable interests.  The phrase numerus clausus means “the 
number is closed.”
240
  This phrase expresses a principle of property law that 
 
 239.  See Hughes, supra note 13, at 184-86, 195-96. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The 
Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds. 
1980).  The view that a contracts/property distinction lacks viability or consequence is 
contested. Hughes, supra note 13, at 184-85. For example, contemporary corporate law 
literature actively engages the question of whether property law—as distinct from contract 
law—matters.  Id. 
 240.  In case law and other legal materials, the principle of numerus clausus relates 
primarily to the rule against creation of new estates.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 
542, 542 (Mass. 1893) (holding that “an estate descending only to heirs on the father’s side 
was a new kind of inheritance” and therefore not enforceable by law).  The most widely-cited 
explication of numerus clausus in U.S. property laws is by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, 
most notably in Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1 (2000) (explaining numerus clausus in economic terms).  Because 
property rights are in rem, third parties must invest in determining the scope of these rights.  
Id. at 8. Property rights that are unusual are more costly to assess.  Id. “Those creating or 
transferring idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be expected to take these increases in 
measurement costs fully into account,” Merrill and Smith explain, “making them a true 
externality.”  Id.  The rules that effectuate the numerus clausus principle in property law 
reduce these measurement costs. Id.  Not all scholars agree with the view of numerus clausus 
presented by Merrill and Smith.  These critics, however, do not reject the concept that 
standardization, or a stable set of forms of interest, is beneficial to markets and relates to the 
capacity of third parties to comprehend interests.  For example, Hansmann and Kraakman 
concede that there must be some institution that enables third parties to determine who 
controls various incidents of ownership; this institution does not have to take the form of 
numerus clausus rules however.  Lee Anne Fennell contends that a state-run “option 
exchange” for property interests would be superior to the rules of numerus clausus for 
balancing third-party information costs with the need for effectuating parties’ interests.  See 
Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORTS L. 1, 53-59 (2011) (a government-
run “option exchange” for property interests would better balance effectuating parties’ intent 
with third party information costs than do rules of numerus clausus); Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and 
the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 382-83, 398 (2002) (the state need not 
regulate the content of property rights, so long as some institution exists to enable third parties 
to identify those who control the various incidents of ownership); Tamar Frankel, The Law of 
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appears across legal systems—property interests must adhere to legally 
recognizable, standardized forms.
241
  In terms of the true-sale doctrine, 
contracting parties cannot create a new, unrecognized form of property 
interest.  The common law recognizes the conveyance of an ownership 
interest (rather than a SISO) only when the level of recourse, or the price, or 
other factors, or a statutory designation, create legal obligations consistent 
with an ownership interest in the purchaser.
242
 
The explicit use of a numerus clausus framework for analyzing true-
sale questions could potentially facilitate coherence.
243
  Lawmakers could 
articulate packages of recourse and price that constitute sales as matter of 
law, and then test individual transactions against recognized templates.
244
  
Scholars have identified the potential of numerus clauses as a strategy to 
reduce information costs surrounding property interests in other contexts.  
For example, Jill Fisch discusses numerus clausus rules to argue that 
interests in mutual funds should come in standardized forms, to reduce 
information costs.  She argues for a “conform or explain” approach, where 
 
Cross-Border Securitization: Lex Juris, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 475, 482-83 (2002) 
(where standardization is optimal, transacting parties tend to produce it regardless of legal 
restrictions on form); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1600-03 (2008) (numerus clausus relates to the need for a stable set 
of forms through which to express property rules evolving in response to competing social 
goals); Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus 
Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 467, 471-74, 478, 490, 405-05, 517 (2011) (criticizing Merrill 
and Smith for implying that a limited set of interests is superior to a larger one, for rooting 
property law in exclusive use, and for arguing that only legislators may create new property 
interests); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1565-68 (2003) 
(departing from Merrill and Smith to argue that the numerus clausus principle works because 
parties to a transaction have expectations about how institutions work, rather than because of 
its external effects such as on information costs).  Cf. Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 
96 GEO. L. J. 1987 (2008) (arguing that Merrill and Smith as well as viewpoints by others do 
not “capture the essence of property”). 
 241.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 240, at 4 (claiming “the principle that 
property rights must conform to certain standardized forms” has no name in common law and 
adopting the phrase “numerus clausus”). 
 242.  Property law invokes a different justificatory framework than contract law. 
Lawmakers can become caught in a discourse which market regulation, or holdings that 
decline to enforce transactions, are viewed as interfering with markets by curtailing market 
actors’ freedom of contract. From a property perspective, though, applying or developing 
legal rules to balance the intentions of market actors with collective and third-party concerns 
is just proper administration of the legal infrastructure of markets. Property law necessarily 
balances the need for liquidity with third-party concerns.  See Hughes, supra note 13, at 182. 
 243.  The concept of numerus clausus, in and of itself, does not speak to the issue of 
whether property consists of in rem rights in assets, or of aggregated legal relations. Hughes, 
supra note 13, at 211-16. 
 244.  Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1961, 2030 (2010) (referencing numerus clausus rules to argue that interests in mutual 
funds should only come in standardized forms in order to drive down information costs). 
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financial transactions either conform to a recognized, widely understood 
form or the parties explain—meaning make explicit—the differences.
245
  
Rules that encourage standardization of receivables assignments for 
securitization could potentially bring clarity to the true-sale doctrine, 
increasing certainty and thereby reducing re-characterization risk. 
Some may object to this idea, on grounds that bespoke receivables 
securitizations involve complex, deal-specific negotiation surrounding 
allocation of risks and returns—and the parties’ tolerance for re-
characterization risk.  (Bankruptcy and litigation of the true-sale question 
may be remote possibilities.)  The capacity of transacting parties to create 
contracts that reflect preferences specific to a given deal or asset pool or 
counterparty contributes to lowering costs of capital for originators.  Lower 
costs of capital benefit non-adjusting creditors as well as originators: any 
regulation of the parties’ freedom of contract in securitizing receivables 
would potentially harm all relevant parties. 
Such thinking deserves due consideration.  However, the task here is to 
think through how to generate a more coherent, policy-based true-sale 
doctrine, given the doctrine’s consequences.  If lawmakers, through public 
discourse and policy debates, determine that the best approach to true sales 
is, for example, to permit transacting parties to elect the status of their 
transaction by contract, regardless of its economic substance, then so be it.  
But to date we have no record of any such deliberation, and we have true-
sale rules that differ across jurisdictions, with no clear or consistent doctrinal 
indicia for characterizing a receivables conveyance.  Given that true-sale 
rules are property rules, the concept of numerus clausus could very well 
facilitate a legal landscape in which third parties have better information 
about securitization transactions, administrative and transaction costs are 
lower, and bankruptcy outcomes are more predictable.  Lower transaction 
costs contribute to lower costs of capital.  Predictability and ease of 
administration of the doctrine lower costs of bankruptcy and litigation, 
potentially preserving assets for distribution to all creditors. 
Rights of exclusion.  A successful approach to the true-sale doctrine 
must explain and justify investors’ rights of exclusion against a company’s 
unsecured creditors.  This justification may lie in the position that 
securitization is efficient and therefore benefits unsecured creditors along 
with investors and originators.  Or, justification may be grounded in other 
concerns.  Regardless of efficiency, policymakers may say, an originator and 
investors cannot claim rights of exclusion against unsecured creditors unless 
the scope of the interest conveyed to the SPE clearly warrants such exclusion 
based on public policy, or on moral theories or labor theories of property, for 
 
 245.  Id. 
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example. 
Property theorists debate the status of exclusion as the sine qua non of 
property interests.
246
  It is not necessary here to engage the scholarly debate 
over whether rights of exclusion are central to property as a theoretical 
matter.  The relevance of exclusion, here, is that the true-sale doctrine 
determines the extent to which investors may exclude unsecured creditors 
from securitized assets.  This framing of the true-sale question emphasizes 
policy considerations concerning the efficiency and distributive impact of 
asset-backed securitizations.
247
 
We may conceive of securitized receivables as ‘things’ from which 
property rights holders may exclude others,
248
 or, conversely, as bundles of 
rights including the right of exclusion.
249
  Either way, exclusion of unsecured 
creditors is (in any given context) efficient or inefficient, just or unjust.  
Approaching the true-sale analysis as a question about exclusion directs 
courts and lawmakers to consider when, why and how property interests 
should confer such rights.  Such an approach differs from current approaches 
in which the law appears to consider the terms of transactions among 
sophisticated commercial actors in the abstract, as a set of contracts that 
results in one classification or the other depending on how the deal terms 
map onto a jurisdiction’s true-sale rules. 
Some may respond, here, that current true-sale rules do express policy 
determinations about rights of exclusion.  The ABS statutes are explicitly 
designed to exclude unsecured creditors from originators’ securitized assets, 
so long as transacting parties use certain contract terms.  And regardless of 
any given state’s approach to true-sale rules, bankruptcy law permits judges 
to exercise discretion.
250
  A judge may, potentially, find an interest in 
securitized assets in situations where the judge finds exclusion of unsecured 
creditors from the bankruptcy estate to be unwarranted.
251
 
 
 246.  See e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Thing about Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. 
RTS. CONF. J. 95, 98-103 (2014) (arguing that the right to exclude is not the “sine qua non of 
property”); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 
(2012) (arguing that “[t]he purposes of property relate to our interest in using things” and 
“[t]here is no interest in exclusion per se”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in 
Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 275 (2008) (proposing a different model for 
understanding ownership); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of 
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593 
(2008) (arguing that exclusion derives from the norm of inviolability); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (arguing that the right to 
exclude is the sine qua non of property). 
 247.  See supra text accompanying notes 68-72. 
 248.  See e.g., Smith, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012), supra note 246.  
 249.  See e.g., Grey, supra note 239. 
 250.  See infra text accompanying notes 266-70. Cf. Plank, supra note 189, at 669. 
 251.  See, e.g., text accompanying notes 159-64 (discussing In re LTV Steel Co., Inc.) and 
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To the extent that true-sale and bankruptcy rules do contemplate the 
justification—on efficiency, fairness, or other grounds—for finding rights of 
exclusion in investors, against unsecured creditors, the true-sale doctrine 
would benefit from a more explicit statement to this effect.  Lawmakers and 
judges have not explicitly considered the doctrine in terms of property and 
exclusion; doing so could help to add justificatory depth and normative 
direction to true-sale determinations. 
IV.   REFORM POSSIBILITIES 
This part identifies possibilities for how lawmakers could approach 
reforming the true-sale doctrine in a way that considers the relationship 
between arguments about the efficiency of securitization and normative 
positions on true-sale rules.
252
 Section A sketches an idea for codifying a new 
approach to true sales within UCC Article 9. Section B discusses the fact that 
true-sale doctrine codification at the federal level (in the bankruptcy code) 
has been proposed before and could be possible again.
253
 
A. U.C.C. Article 9 
Article 9 governs a particular type of property interest—the security 
interest—setting forth the rules for effective creation, enforceability and 
priority of such interests.  Texas and Louisiana have already codified true-
sale rules in UCC Article 9, as discussed above.
254
  This section will not 
further discuss those rules.  Commentators who take the position that it 
advances efficiency to eliminate re-characterization risk with an ABS statute 
may support enactment of non-uniform section 9-109(e).
255
 
This section raises the possibility of looking to sections 9-203, 9-109, 
and UCC Article 1, to enact an approach to true sales of receivables that links 
true-sale status to the adequacy of purchase price.  This discussion is 
preliminary: it is an idea for how we might use concepts in the U.C.C. to 
codify a more consistent and policy-based set of true-sale rules for the 
receivables securitization context.
256
  In UCC Article 9 terms, the true-sale 
test determines when assignments of the assets covered by 9-109(a)(3) 
 
206-14 (discussing possible federal pre-emption of ABS statutes in bankruptcy). 
 252.  Any state-level codification of true-sale rules could face the same preemption 
possibilities in bankruptcy that the ABS statutes face. See supra text accompanying notes 204-
12. 
 253.  See infra text accompanying notes 271-85. 
 254.  See supra text accompanying notes 42 , 77. 
 255.  See supra text accompanying notes 73-92. 
 256.  A more complete proposal for Article 9 true-sale provisions is beyond this Article’s 
capacity; it is the subject of a separate project.  
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constitute SISOs within the scope of 9-109(a)(1), versus when they 
constitute sales within the scope of 9-109(a)(3). 
A thorough presentation of this idea would require analysis of: (i) why, 
from a policy standpoint, lawmakers should codify the relevance of price in 
true-sale determinations,
257
 and (ii) the function and formulation of the UCC 
Article 9 provisions mentioned here, to explore whether they would be 
appropriate sites for true-sale law reform.  Neither of these tasks is within 
this Article’s capacity.  The first task would involve taking the analysis that 
this Article provides, applying arguments about securitization’s efficiency 
and fairness to build a position in favor of an approach that finds investors’ 
rights of exclusion to be justified when investors have paid an adequate price 
for their interest.  The second task involves detailed research into history, 
functionality, and policy objectives embodied in UCC sections 9-109 and 9-
203, among others, along with the provisions of UCC Article 1. 
As previously discussed, a true-sale doctrine that turns on price 
considerations is complex and potentially difficult to administer, given the 
various factors (recourse, market direction, bargaining position, historical 
default rates) that legitimately affect a fair price for receivables.
258
  Given 
this complexity, a statutory formulation of complete true-sale criteria 
grounded in price may be infeasible.  It is feasible, however, to consider 
provisions that codify the relevance of price and allocate burdens of proof 
with respect to the adequacy of price. 
If lawmakers wanted to codify the relevance of price in true-sale 
determinations, they could draft provisions for UCC Article 1 that reference 
adequacy of price in defining a “true sale” of receivables.259 Or, consider a 
provision linking the “value given”
260
 for purposes of section 9-203(b)(1) to 
the distinction between deals covered by section 9-109(a)(1) (i.e., SISOs), 
versus those covered by 9-109(a)(3) (i.e., sales of receivables).  UCC Article 
9, in section 9-109, could establish that, in order to fall within the scope of 
section 9-109(a)(3)—and not 9-109(a)(1)—the value given, pursuant to 9-
203(b)(1) must reflect a fair market price for the assets assigned, considering 
the terms of the assignment.  The code could then allocate the burden of 
proof—to either the debtor or the purchaser—with respect to the adequacy 
of the purchase price for purposes of classifying a deal under 9-109(a).
261
 
 
 257.  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 175-88. 
 258.  See supra text accompanying notes 175-88. 
   259.   Harris and Mooney’s proposal depends on an analogy between true leases and true 
sales of receivables.  See Harris & Mooney, supra note 15. UCC Article 1 provides a 
definition of true lease.  See U.C.C. § 1-203. Lawmakers could elaborate on that analogy and 
undertake an Article 1 proposal for true sales. 
 260.  See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1).  The UCC defines “value” in section 1-204. 
 261.  Again, a separate project undertakes the task of analyzing the relevant sections of 
UCC 9 in detail to present and assess this schema. 
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The “value given” requirement for attachment of a security interest is a 
consideration requirement.  Contract law requires consideration to create a 
legally binding agreement.  UCC Article 9 requires consideration to create a 
legally enforceable security interest—a contractual lien.  Contract law does 
not test the adequacy of consideration.  Property law, however, will consider 
the adequacy of consideration to determine the scope of property interest that 
a transaction creates.  It does so, for example, when it considers the price of 
a real estate conveyance to determine whether equitable mortgage rules 
require treating a lease transaction as, instead, a sale with mortgage 
financing.
262
 
The type of statutory approach sketched here would not eliminate the 
need for courts to consider factors in characterizing any given deal.  It could, 
however, establish the relevance of one factor—price—and set burdens of 
proof in order to generate precedents that create useful categories for 
characterizing (and structuring) receivables securitizations going forward. 
B. Bankruptcy law 
Generally speaking, state property law determines the scope of a 
bankrupt entity’s estate.  In Butner v. United States
263
 the Court expressed 
the principle that “property interests are created and defined by state law.”
264
  
This principle suggests that bankruptcy law may not be an appropriate 
context in which to effectuate a property-based reform of the true-sale 
doctrine.  If state law defines property interests, then bankruptcy is largely 
procedural.
265
  State law establishes when a property interest confers rights 
of exclusion consistent with ownership (acquired in a sale), as opposed to 
security (acquired as collateral for a loan).  Bankruptcy law, then, 
administers disposition of assets depending on whether, under state law, the 
bankrupt entity retains a property interest in assets sufficient for a bankruptcy 
trustee’s lien to attach. 
This general schema is over-simplified, however.  Scholars such as 
Barry Adler and Edward J. Janger complicate the Butner principle by 
illuminating continuity between bankruptcy law and property law—and also 
 
 262.  See supra text accompanying notes 179-80. 
 263.  440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
 264.  Id. See also Raleigh v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000); BFP v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994); Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 
U.S. 324, 329 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1992). 
 265.  See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy as property law, in KENNETH AYOTTE AND HENRY 
E. SMITH EDS., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW (2011) 
(contesting the Butner principle and arguing for expression of the property-law aspects of 
bankruptcy and the insolvency law aspects of property). 
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between property law and issues of insolvency.
266
  The question of whether 
and when federal bankruptcy law does or should recognize legal rights of 
exclusion from assets is complex.  Lawmakers could consider the bankruptcy 
code as a potential site for establishing a more coherent true-sale doctrine.
267
  
Excavating the questions of federalism that this position would raise is 
beyond this project’s scope.  Ronald Mann writes that “securitization raises 
difficult policy questions in part because it falls at the boundary between 
those two spheres”
268
—the sphere of Congress’s power to enact bankruptcy 
laws,
269
 on the one hand, and of states’ traditional control over basic issues 
of commercial law, on the other.
270
  As such, the purpose of this section is 
merely to identify this issue, and to include it in this Part’s sketch of possible 
sites for reform of the true-sale doctrine. 
A short-lived proposal to reform the bankruptcy code in the wake of 
LTV Steel—proposed section 912
271
—corroborates this observation.  
Proposed section 912 provides an example of an instance in which 
substantive questions about the scope of bankruptcy estates potentially 
involving securitized assets were considered for enactment in federal 
bankruptcy law.
272
 
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Act defines property that belongs to the 
bankruptcy estate.
273
  In 2001, efforts to reform the Bankruptcy Act included 
an amendment to section 541 that would have removed from the bankruptcy 
estate: 
 
 266.  See Adler, supra note 265; Janger, supra note 10, at 1785-87. Cf. Plank, supra note 
212. 
 267.  Cf. Janger, supra note 10, at 1785-87. 
 268.  Mann supra note 13, at 1806. 
 269.  See Plank, supra note 212 (discussing the scope of, and limitations, on this power). 
 270. Id.   
Mann observes that as globalization makes “the American business environment 
ever more competitive, . . . state legislatures will more frequently . . . be pressed 
to take sides in contentious issues about commercial finance.” Mann, supra note 
13, at 1828. As such, “the time will come when federal bankruptcy courts must 
draw the line somewhere between their deference to those enactments and the 
need to enforce uniform federal bankruptcy policy.”  
 271.  See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, H.R. 333, 107th Cong; H.R. 333, 107th 
Cong. § 912(i) (2001). The securitization industry responded quickly to the holding in In re 
LTV Steel Company, Inc., instigating this effort to enact federal true-sale safe harbor rules for 
securitization. See Solomon, infra note 284, at 867. 
 272.  Other proposals to reform priorities in bankruptcy that would affect bankruptcy 
estates of securitization originators have also arisen.  See, e.g., The Employee Abuse 
Prevention Act of 2002, S. 2798, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(proposed by Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-Illinois) and Rep. William D. Delahunt (D-
Massachusetts) in an effort to give greater priority in bankruptcy to workers and retirees in 
some circumstances). 
 273.  11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006). 
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Any eligible asset
274
 (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such 
eligible asset was transferred by the debtor . . . to an eligible 
entity
275
 in connection with an asset-backed securitization,
276
 
except to the extent such assets (or proceeds or value thereof) may 
be recovered by the trustee under section 550 by virtue of 
avoidance under section 548(a). . . .
277
 
Section 912 would have functioned similarly to the state ABS statutes—
it creates a safe harbor, from re-characterization—for securitization 
transactions.
278
  Proposed section 912 was not quite as broad as the ABS 
statutes, however.  It set two conditions for the applicability of its safe 
harbor: (i) the originator must represent and warrant under written agreement 
that assets were sold to the SPE with intention of making them bankruptcy 
remote, and (ii) at least one tranche of securities issued in the deal had to be 
rated investment grade at the time of the initial issuance.
279
 
While the safe harbor would not have extended to fraudulent transfers 
under section 548(a), from the originator to the SPE, this exception did not 
alter the provision’s overall intent.  Fraudulent transfer law concerns 
transfers that are made for too little value by an insolvent debtor.  The 
“reasonably equivalent value” tests in fraudulent transfer law prevent gifts 
or transfers for minimal value to avoid creditors; they do not police the 
 
 274.  The bill defines “eligible asset” as financial assets, cash and securities. Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 2001, supra note 44, at § 912(ii). This would include receivables. 
 275.  “Eligible entity” is “an issuer” or “any “other entity engaged exclusively in the 
business of acquiring and transferring eligible assets directly or indirectly to an issuer.” 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 44, at § 912(ii). This would include a 
securitization SPE. 
 276.  The bill states:  
The term ‘asset-backed securitization’ means a transaction in which eligible 
assets transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of payment on 
securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued by governmental 
units, at least one class or tranche of which was rated investment grade by one or 
more nationally recognized securities rating organizations, when the securities 
were initially issued by an issuer. 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 44, at § 912(ii). See also Lipson, supra note  50. 
 277.  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, H.R. 333, 107th Cong; H.R. 333, 107th 
Cong. § 912(i) (2001). 
 278.  See Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead 
or Dormant?, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101 (2002); Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, the 
Proposed Bankruptcy Code Amendments and Securitizing Debtors and Their Creditors, 7 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 321, 348–51 (2002); Jonathan C Lipson, Section 912 is 
Dangerous, BUS. L. TODAY, July/August 2002, at 33, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2002/07/two-views-
200207.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW9F-TPK9]. 
 279.  See Schwarcz, infra note 282, at 359. 
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boundary between sales and loans.
280
 
By September 2002, Section 912 was deleted from both the House and 
the Senate versions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer 
Protection Act of 2001,
281
 following Enron’s bankruptcy.
282
 Enron’s misuse 
of securitization transactions
283
 created doubt about the desirability of section 
912.
284
 
Assessment of the desirability of amending the Bankruptcy Act with the 
true-sale rules contained in proposed section 912 would follow the same 
analysis as above, regarding the ABS statutes.  Since “eligible assets” under 
section 912 means financial assets, cash, and securities, the section would 
have involved securitizations of replaceable assets—not essential assets—
for purposes of that analysis.  In other words, section 912 reads more like a 
bankruptcy law version of Texas’s UCC section 9-109(e) than of Delaware’s 
Asset Backed Securities Facilitation Act.
285
  The point, here, is merely to 
illustrate how, despite section 541 and the Butner principle, bankruptcy law 
has been, and can be again, a potential cite for codifying true-sale rules.
286
 
CONCLUSION: AN ADDITIONAL TAKE ON WHY THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE 
 
 280.  See Letter from Allan Axelrod, Professor Emeritus, Rutgers School of Law – 
Newark, et al., to Sen. Patrick Leahy and Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner (Jan. 23, 2002), 
available at http://www.abi.org/abi-journal/legislative-update-proposed-rules-amendments-
published-for-public-comment [https://perma.cc/QT43-PR4B]. 
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Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1314-18 (2002); In re Enron Corp. Sec., 
Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 610 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
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Lipson, supra note 50, at 1269-71. 
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& BUS. 89, 101 n.49 (2004); Dov Solomon, The Rise of a Giant: Securitization and the Global 
Financial Crisis, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 859, 866 n.36 (2012). 
 285.  See supra text accompanying notes 194-97. 
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Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2013); Jodie A. Kirshner, The 
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MATTERS 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, public discourse has focused on federal 
financial regulation to respond to negative externalities associated with 
securitization.  But choices of private-law rules also express policy 
objectives and effectuate market governance.
287
  The state-level, private-law 
infrastructure of financial markets is an under-explored source of regulatory 
innovation.
288
  The rules governing true sales of receivables provide exactly 
the type of context in which revisiting a private-law doctrine might improve 
market governance. 
The literature on securitization and bankruptcy remoteness provides 
ample material for formulating approaches to true sales that could reflect and 
express policy objectives surrounding the securitization market.  Relating 
this literature to the true-sale doctrine encourages a more informed, policy-
driven approach to these rules.  At the same time, making explicit that true-
sale rules are about property—and relating them to the property concepts of 
numerus clausus and exclusion—can facilitate coherence and normative 
direction in formulating these rules. 
In his work on finance and our republic, Robert Hockett has stated that 
the “nemeses Jefferson and Hamilton . . . appear to have shared a view of the 
place of remunerative individual endeavor and productive autonomy in an 
enduring republic and of the place of finance in assuring that both remain 
always available to productive-republican citizens.”
289
  He distinguishes a 
“productive-republican” view of finance that he finds expressed in our 
nation’s founding, from a “liberal” view that has become prevalent more 
recently.
290
  The productive-republican view regards financial activity as 
instrumentally good, enabling citizens to engage in market activity 
consistent with collective republic-making.
291
  The liberal view, in contrast, 
“takes market activity to be intrinsically good, if not indeed a matter of 
inherent political-cum-moral right.”
292
  Hockett’s presentation of these 
contrasting approaches to finance reminds us of the depth of implication that 
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legal rules governing market activity can have. 
A legal doctrine at the heart of capital markets, such as the true-sale 
doctrine, deserves substantive vetting.  Virtually no legislative history 
surrounds enactment of the ABS statutes
293
 and commentary on the common-
law doctrine is sparse.  Lawmakers who have reformed true-sale rules seem 
to have done so in accord with the proclivities of those seeking to minimize 
re-characterization risk without explication of efficiency or fairness 
considerations surrounding that policy choice.  If, ultimately, lawmakers 
seek to enact safe-harbors in favor of investors, or to permit externalization 
of costs onto non-adjusting creditors, they should do so with explicit 
dedication to policy implications and with some conception of the function 
and value of finance.  Otherwise, we leave in disarray an area of law with 
profound distributive and market effects. 
 
 
 293.  See supra text accompanying note 190. 
